4 ideas
| 16463 | Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't. | |
| From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2 | |
| A reaction: This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible. |
| 12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Skeptics may doubt the truth of things, and if it pleases them to call the things that occur to us dreams, it suffices for these dreams to be in agreement with each other, and to obey certain laws. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
| A reaction: Leibniz flirted a great deal with phenomenalism throughout the middle of his career, as charted by Garber. Descartes made similar points. It is really only Berkeley who took this idea seriously. |
| 12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: He who can finally make predictions with success must be said to have become sufficiently proficient in nature. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7 | |
| A reaction: Is prediction achieved by knowledge of laws, or knowledge of essences and powers? The trouble with most laws is that they permit exceptions. 'Things fall, unless prevented' etc. |
| 22457 | If the aim is good outcomes, why are killings worse than deaths? [Scheffler, by Foot] |
| Full Idea: It is not clear why, in the measurement of the goodness of states of affairs or total outcomes, killings for instance should count so much more heavily than deaths. | |
| From: report of Samuel Scheffler (The Rejection of Consequentialism [1982], pp.108-12) by Philippa Foot - Utilitarianism and the Virtues p.61 | |
| A reaction: Or drunken drivers worse than careless drivers. Or stolen bracelets than lost bracelets. The point is that morality is about the behaviour of people, and not about consequences. |