10 ideas
3067 | A philosopher should have principles ready for understanding, like a surgeon with instruments [Aurelius] |
Full Idea: As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so should you have principles ready for the understanding of things divine and human. | |
From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 3.13) | |
A reaction: Nice. Philosophy is the training ground where wisdom and good living are made possible, but it cannot be a substitute for living. |
3072 | Everything is changing, including yourself and the whole universe [Aurelius] |
Full Idea: All things are changing; and you yourself are in continuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too. | |
From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 9.19) |
16463 | Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't. | |
From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2 | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible. |
9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Why should we accept that necessities can only be known a priori? Prima facie, some necessities are known empirically; for example, that water is necessarily H2O, and that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus. | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2) | |
A reaction: An important question, whatever your view. If the only thing we can know a priori is necessities, it doesn't follow that necessities can only be known a priori. It gets interesting if we say that some necessities can never be known a priori. |
9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
Full Idea: We have no need to turn to an a priori explanation of our knowledge of mathematics and logic. Our intuitions that this knowledge is not justified in some direct empirical way is preserved. It is justified in an indirect holistic way. | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2) | |
A reaction: I think this is roughly the right story, but the only way it will work is if we have some sort of theory of abstraction, which gets us up the ladder of generalisations to the ones which, it appears, are necessarily true. |
9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of the a priori is too obscure for it to feature in a good explanation of our knowledge of anything. | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §3) | |
A reaction: I never like this style of argument. It would be nice if all the components of all our our explanations were crystal clear. Total clarity about anything is probably a hopeless dream, and we may have to settle for murky corners in all explanations. |
3066 | Nothing is evil which is according to nature [Aurelius] |
Full Idea: Nothing is evil which is according to nature. | |
From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 2.17) | |
A reaction: A bit hopeful. Sounds tautological. I.e. anything which is agreed to be evil is probably immediately labelled as 'unnatural'. What would he agree was evil? |
3071 | Justice has no virtue opposed to it, but pleasure has temperance opposed to it [Aurelius] |
Full Idea: In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to pleasure, and that is temperance. | |
From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 8.39) | |
A reaction: There are plenty of hideous things opposed to justice, but presumably that immediately disqualifies them from being virtues. |
3069 | The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's [Aurelius] |
Full Idea: The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's. | |
From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 7.61) |
3065 | Humans are naturally made for co-operation [Aurelius] |
Full Idea: We are made for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. To act against one another, then, is contrary to nature. | |
From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 2.1) |