Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Thisness', 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' and 'Possible Worlds'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: Interpreting a text is a matter of making sense of it. And to make sense of a text is to represent it as making sense.
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro.2)
     A reaction: 'Making sense' is obviously not a very precise or determinate concept. It is probably better to say that the process is 'trying' to make sense of the text, because most texts don't totally make sense.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: According to the Principle of Bipolarity, every meaningful sentence must be capable both of being true and of being false. It is not enough merely that every sentence must be either true or false (which is Bivalence).
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 3D)
     A reaction: It is said that early Wittgenstein endorses this. That is, in addition to being true, the sentence must be capable of falsehood (and vice versa). This seems to be flirting with the verification principle. I presume it is 'affirmative' sentences.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: There are two problems with defining the quantifiers in terms of conjunction and disjunction. The general statements are unspecific, and do not say which things have the properties, and also they can't range over infinite objects.
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 5C)
     A reaction: That is, the universal quantifier is lots of ands, and the existential is lots of ors. If there only existed finite objects, then naming them all would be universal, and the infinite wouldn't be needed.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: Just distinguishing things is not enough for counting (and hence arithmetic). We need the crucial extra notion of the successor in a series of some kind.
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro.5)
     A reaction: This is a step towards the Peano Axioms of arithmetic. The successors could be fingers and toes, taken in a conventional order, and matched one-to-one to the objects. 'My right big toe of cows' means 16 cows (but non-verbally).
To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: Distinguishing between things is not enough for counting. …We need the crucial extra notion of a successor in a series of a certain kind.
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the thinking that led to the Dedekind-Peano axioms for arithmetic. E.g. each series member can only have one successor. There is an unformalisable assumption that the series can then be applied to the things.
Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: The discrimination of things for counting needs to bring with it the notion of identity (and, correlatively, distinctness).
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro.5)
     A reaction: Morris is exploring how practices like counting might reveal necessary truths about the world.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06
     A reaction: Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2
     A reaction: This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis's knowledge of what possible worlds there are and of other general truths about worlds is posterior, not prior, to his knowledge of what things are possible and what things are impossible.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: This elementary objection seems to me to destroy any attempt to explain modality in terms of possible worlds. It is a semantics for modal statements, but that doesn't make it an ontology. To assess possibilities, study actuality.
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis must seek some ontological ground for the grouping of possibilia into disjoint worlds.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07
     A reaction: I do love people like Lycan who ask the simple commonsense questions about these highly sophisticated systems that students of philosophy are required to study. If a proposition is a 'set of worlds', understanding a proposition is beyond me.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The general form of the proposition is: Such and such is the case.
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 4.5)
     A reaction: [last bit in Ogden translation] LW eventually expresses this symbolically. We could just say a proposition is an assertion. This strikes as either a rather empty claim, or an unfounded one.