Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'An American Indian model of the Universe' and 'Phenomenalism'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


7 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Hopi consistently prefers verbs and events to nouns and things [Whorf]
     Full Idea: Hopi, with its preference for verbs, as contrasted to our own liking for nouns, perpetually turns our propositions about things into propositions about events.
     From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (An American Indian model of the Universe [1936], p.63)
     A reaction: This should provoke careful thought about ontology - without concluding that it is entirely relative to language.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Scientific thought is essentially a specialised part of Indo-European languages [Whorf]
     Full Idea: What we call "scientific thought" is a specialisation of the western Indo-European type of language.
     From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (An American Indian model of the Universe [1936], p.246)
     A reaction: This is the beginnings of an absurd extreme relativist view of science, based on a confusion about meaning and thought.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The Hopi have no concept of time as something flowing from past to future [Whorf]
     Full Idea: A Hopi has no general notion or intuition of time as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal rate, out of a future, through a present, into a past.
     From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (An American Indian model of the Universe [1936], p.57)
     A reaction: If true, this would not so much support relativism of language as the view that that conception of time is actually false.