Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'The Truth in Relativism' and 'On the General Idea of Proof Theory'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence

13827	Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
	Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments.
	From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2)

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models

13826	Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
	Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things.
	From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1)

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

3570	Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts

2748	A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
	A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism

22450	If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
	Full Idea: If some societies with divergent moral systems merely confront each other, having no use for the assertion that their own systems are true and the others false except to mark the system to which they adhere, then relativism is a true theory of morality.
	From: report of Bernard Williams (The Truth in Relativism [1974]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Relativism p.3
	A reaction: 'Having no use for' an assertion is not the same as the assertion being impossible. Some liberal cultures refuse to criticise others because their highest value is tolerance, even when the target culture wholly contradicts the critics' other values.