15 ideas
| 7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm. | |
| From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1 | |
| A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere. |
| 3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification). | |
| From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2 |
| 2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth"). | |
| From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1 | |
| A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that. |
| 6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
| Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic. | |
| From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194) | |
| A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north? |
| 4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
| 4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |
| A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
| 4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |
| A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
| 6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
| Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them. | |
| From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198) | |
| A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist. |
| 6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
| Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science. | |
| From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203) | |
| A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist? |
| 4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
| 4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
| A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |
| 4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
| 4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
| 4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
| 4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |
| From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |