Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'In Defence of Convention T' and 'English as a Formal Language'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation [Montague]
     Full Idea: The expression 'The' turns out to play the role of a quantifier, in complete analogy with 'every' and 'a', and does not generate (in common with common noun phrases) denoting expressions
     From: Richard Montague (English as a Formal Language [1970], p.216), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 4
     A reaction: Linsky says that it is now standard to interpret definite descriptions as quantifiers
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
     Full Idea: For a theory of meaning for a fragment of natural language, what Davidson requires, in effect, is that the sentences be translatable into the language of Frege's symbolic logic.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (In Defence of Convention T [1973]) by David Macey - Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory
     A reaction: This assumes the adequacy of Fregean logic, which seems unlikely. Is this the culmination of Leibniz's dream of a fully logical language - so that anything that won't fit into our logical form is ruled (logical positivist style) as meaningless?