Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Presentation of Self in Everyday Life' and 'On Probability and Induction'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

22361	Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: Reichenbach's claim is interpreted as saying that contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, are irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory.
	From: report of Hans Reichenbach (On Probability and Induction [1938], pp.36-7) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 3.2
	A reaction: This influential idea is very helpful. It allows Galileo and co to pursus all sorts of highly personal and quirky lines of enquiry, because we only demand full objectivity when it is all over. Very good!

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

3570	Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts

2748	A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
	A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

8044	Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre]
	Full Idea: Erving Goffman has liquidated the self into its role-playing, arguing that the self is no more than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung.
	From: report of Erving Goffman (Presentation of Self in Everyday Life [1959]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.3
	A reaction: A rather unsympathetic expression of his view, but it seems to be a widely held view among students of sociology. But then sociologists are almost committed a priori to a social and relativist view of truth, persons, knowledge, religion etc.