Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Philosophy of Revelation' and 'works'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
17743 De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22072 Schelling always affirmed the absolute status of freedom [Schelling, by Courtine]
     Full Idea: Throughout Schelling's work we find the affirmation of absolute freedom or of the absolute as freedom.
     From: report of Friedrich Schelling (Philosophy of Revelation [1843], Vol.13 p.359) by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.83
     A reaction: Of all of the German idealists, Schelling may be the closest to modern existentialism.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.