22 ideas
10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
Full Idea: It is generally accepted that mathematics reduces to set theory, and I argue that set theory in turn reduces, with some aid of mereology, to the theory of the singleton function. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.03) |
10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In my usage of 'class', there is no such things as the null class. I don't mind calling some memberless thing - some individual - the null set. But that doesn't make it a memberless class. Rather, that makes it a 'set' that is not a class. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.05) | |
A reaction: Lewis calls this usage 'idiosyncratic', but it strikes me as excellent. Set theorists can have their vital null class, and sensible people can be left to say, with Lewis, that classes of things must have members. |
10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The null set serves two useful purposes. It is a denotation of last resort for class abstracts that denote no nonempty class. And it is an individual of last resort: we can count on its existence, and fearlessly build the hierarchy of sets from it. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.09) | |
A reaction: This passage assuages my major reservation about the existence of the null set, but at the expense of confirming that it must be taken as an entirely fictional entity. |
10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Should we accept the null set as a most extraordinary individual, a little speck of sheer nothingness, a sort of black hole in the fabric of Reality itself? Not that either, I think. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.09) | |
A reaction: Correct! |
10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A new student of set theory has just one thing, the element, and he has another single thing, the singleton, and not the slightest guidance about what one thing has to do with the other. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.12) |
10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.13) |
10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification, as advocated by George Boolos, to the language of mereology. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.03) |
10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We can simulate quantification over relations using megethology. Roughly, a quantifier over relations is a plural quantifier over things that encode ordered pairs by mereological means. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.18) | |
A reaction: [He credits this idea to Burgess and Haven] The point is to avoid second-order logic, which quantifies over relations as ordered n-tuple sets. |
10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We can take the theory of singleton functions, and hence set theory, and hence mathematics, to consist of generalisations about all singleton functions. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.03) | |
A reaction: At first glance this sounds like a fancy version of the somewhat discredited Greek idea that mathematics is built on the concept of a 'unit'. |
10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We needn't believe in 'abstract structures' to have general structural truths about all successor functions. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.16) |
10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I accept the principle of Unrestricted Composition: whenever there are some things, no matter how many or how unrelated or how disparate in character they may be, they have a mereological fusion. ...The trout-turkey is part fish and part fowl. | |
From: David Lewis (Mathematics is Megethology [1993], p.07) | |
A reaction: This nicely ducks the question of when things form natural wholes and when they don't, but I would have thought that that might be one of the central issues of metaphysicals, so I think I'll give Lewis's principle a miss. |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between 'animal knowledge' (which requires only apt belief), and 'reflective knowledge' (requiring both apt and justified belief). | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Sosa 1991] My inclination (Idea 19711) was to think of knowledge as a continuum (possibly with a contextual component), and this distinction doesn't change my view, though it makes the point. |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification). | |
From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2 |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
Full Idea: It is widely believed that epistemic justification is distinct from other species of justification such as moral or pragmatic justification in that it is intended to serve the so-called 'truth-goal'. | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: Kvanvig explicitly argues against this view. He broadens the aims, but it strikes me that other aims are all intertwined with truth in some way, so I find this idea quite plausible. |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
Full Idea: Since mentalism remains neutral on whether mental states need be accessible to an agent ...it does not seem to do justice to the intuitions that drive paradigm internalist positions. | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 A) | |
A reaction: The rival view is 'access internalism', which implies that you can act on and take responsibility for your knowledge, because you are aware of its grounding. If animals know things, that might fit the mentalist picture better. |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
Full Idea: A strong form of 'access internalism' is when an agent is required to be actually aware of the conditions that constitute justification; a weaker version loosens the accessibility condition, requiring only the ability to access the justification. | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 B) | |
A reaction: The super strong version implies that you probably only know one thing at a time, so it must be nonsense. The weaker version has grey areas. I remember roughly the justification, but not the details. The justification is in my diary. Etc. |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
Full Idea: Access internalism may also have a truth-conducive conception of justification, where one should not only know what one's reasons are, but also why one's beliefs are probable on one's reasons. | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 B) | |
A reaction: [he cites Bonjour 1985] Sounds reasonable. It would seem odd if you had clear access to the reason, but didn't understand it, because you had just learned it by rote. |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
Full Idea: The internalist approach in epistemology seems to suggest an over-inellectualized and deliberative picture of our belief-forming activities. | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2.2 B) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as confused. The question is not how do I arrive at my beliefs but what justifies my believing them, and what justifies the beliefs in themselves? My head is full of daft beliefs produced by TV advertising. |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
Full Idea: According to the 'mentalist' version of internalism, an externalist is someone who maintains that two people can be in the same present mental states while one has a justified belief and the other does not. | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 A) | |
A reaction: It seems an unlikely coincidence, that we have identical mental states, but your is (say) reliably created but mine isn't. Nevertheless this does seem to be an implication of externalism, though not a definition of it. |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth"). | |
From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1 | |
A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that. |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
Full Idea: The causal theory of justification was soon replaced by Nozick's construal of knowledge as counterfactually sensitive to its truth value (that is, it tracks truth). A counterfactual theory of causation connects this to the causal theory. | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: This is presented as an externalist theory, close to the causal theory (and prior to the reliability theory). But how could you be 'sensitive' to a changing truth if the justification was all external? Externally supported beliefs seem ossified. |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
Full Idea: Internalists say that externalism is inadequate because it makes the obtaining of knowledge and justified beliefs too easy | |
From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: This looks like a key issue in epistemology. Do children and animals have lots of knowledge, which they soak up unthinkingly, or do only thinking adults really 'know' things? Why not have degrees of knowledge? |