6 ideas
9052 | Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: In a slogan, Unger's thesis is that all vague predicates lack application ('nihilism', says Williamson). Classical logic can be retained in its entirety. There are no borderline cases: for vague F, everything is not F; nothing is either F or borderline F. | |
From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1 | |
A reaction: Vague F could be translated as 'I'm quite tempted to apply F', in which case Unger is right. This would go with Russell's view. Logic and reason need precise concepts. The only strategy with vagueness is to reason hypothetically. |
16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
Full Idea: Eliminativism is often associated with Unger, who defends 'mereological nihilism', that there are no composite objects (objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (with no proper parts). The nihilist denies statues and ships. | |
From: report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 4 | |
A reaction: The puzzle here is that he has a very clear notion of identity for the simples, but somehow bars combinations from having identity. So identity is simplicity? 'Complex identity' doesn't sound like an oxymoron. We're stuck if there are no simples. |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification). | |
From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2 |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth"). | |
From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1 | |
A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that. |
2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Fodor concludes that every predicate that a brain could learn to use must have a translation into the computer language of that brain. So no "new" concepts can be acquired: all concepts are innate! | |
From: Hilary Putnam (What is innate and why [1980], p.407) | |
A reaction: Some misunderstanding, surely? No one could be so daft as to think that everyone has an innate idea of an iPod. More basic innate building blocks for thought are quite plausible. |
2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Computers have a built-in language, but not a language that contains quantifiers (that is, the words "all" and "some"). …So generalizations (containing "all") cannot ever be stated in machine language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (What is innate and why [1980], p.408) | |
A reaction: Computers are too sophisticated to need quantification (which is crude). Computers can work with very precise and complex specifications of the domain of a given variable. |