4 ideas
3536 | Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim] |
Full Idea: Each supervenient property necessarily has a coextensive property in the base family. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Concepts of supervenience [1984], §5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the minimum requirement for a situation of supervenience. How do you decide which property is the 'base' property? Do we just mean that the base causes the other, but not vice versa? |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification). | |
From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2 |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth"). | |
From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1 | |
A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that. |
14367 | An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens] |
Full Idea: On Woodward's manipulationist view, an explanation would take the form of a causal graph. | |
From: report of James Woodward (Making Things Happen [2003]) by Michael Strevens - No Understanding without Explanation 1 | |
A reaction: The idea is that causation is all to do with how nature responds when you try to manipulate it. I'm certainly in favour of tying explanation closely to causation. |