Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Ordinatio' and 'Elusive Knowledge'

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15 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: Accidents are principles of acting and principles of cognizing substance, and are the per se objects of the senses. But it is ridiculous to say that something is a principle of acting (either real or intentional) and yet does not have any formal being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.12.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.5
     A reaction: Pasnau cites this as the key scholastic argument for accidental properties having some independent and real existence (as required for Transubstantiation). Rival views say accidents are just 'modes' of a thing's existence. Aquinas compromised.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that if everything is singular, with no objective common feature, science would be impossible, as it proceeds from general concepts. General is the opposite of singular, so it would be inadequate to understand a singular reality.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: [compressed] It is a fact that if you generalise about 'tigers', you are glossing over the individuality of each singular tiger. That is OK for 'electron', if they really are identical, but our general predicates may be imposing identity on electrons.
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that there must be some non-singular aspects of things, since there are some 'less than numerical differences' among them. A horse and a tulip differ more from each other than do two horses.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: This seems to treat being 'singular' as if it were being a singularity. Presumably he is contemplating a thing being nothing but its Scotist haecceity. A neat argument, but I don't buy it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: What is it [that establishes distinctness of things]? It is, to be sure, that which is universally the reason for distinguishing one thing from another: namely, a contradiction…..If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.2
     A reaction: This is a remarkably intellectualist view of such things. John Wycliff, apparently, enquired about how animals were going to manage all this sort of thing. It should appeal to the modern logical approach to metaphysics.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: For Scotus, the haecceity of an individual was a positive non-quidditative entity which, together with a common nature from which it was formally distinct, played the role of the ultimate differentia, thus individuating the substance.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.3
     A reaction: Most thinkers seem to agree (with me) that this is a non-starter, an implausible postulate designed to fill a gap in a metaphysic that hasn't been properly worked out. Leibniz is the hero who faces the problem and works around it.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: It seems absurd …that there should be no difference between a whole that is one thing per se, and a whole that is one thing by aggregation, like a cloud or a heap.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], III.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.5
     A reaction: Leibniz invented monads because he was driven crazy by the quest for 'true unity' in things. Objective unity may be bogus, but I suspect that imposing plausible unity on things is the only way we can grasp the world.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: What is it in this stone, by which ...it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into its subjective parts?
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], II d3 p1 q2 n48)
     A reaction: This is the origin of the concept of haecceity, when Scotus wants to know what exactly individuates each separate entity. He may have been mistaken in thinking that such a question has an answer.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.3
     A reaction: This is the contrapositive of the indiscernibility of identicals, expressed in terms of what is true about a thing, rather than what properties pertain to it.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I allow knowledge without belief, as in the case of the timid student who knows the answer but has no confidence that he has it right, and so does not believe what he knows.
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.429)
     A reaction: [He cites Woozley 1953 for the timid student] I don't accept this example (since my views on knowledge are rather traditional, I find). Why would the student give that answer if they didn't believe it? Sustained timid correctness never happens.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If you claim that S knows that P, and yet grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility of not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge just sounds contradictory.
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.419)
     A reaction: Starting from this point, fallibilism seems to be a rather bold move. The only sensible response seems to be to relax the requirement that not-P must be eliminable. Best: in one epistemic context P, in another not-P.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I don't agree that the mark of knowledge is justification, first because justification isn't sufficient - your true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn't knowledge, whatever the odds; and also not necessary - for what supports perception or memory?
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996])
     A reaction: I don't think I agree. The point about the lottery is that an overwhelming reason will never get you to knowing that you won't win. But good reasons are coherent, not statistical. If perceptions are dubious, justification must be available.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions on the domain of quantification.
     From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended p.68
     A reaction: I think the shifting 'domain of quantification' is one of the most interesting features of ordinary talk. Or, more plainly. 'what are you actually talking about?' is the key question in any fruitful dialogue. Sophisticated speakers tacitly shift domain.
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: S knows P if S's evidence eliminates every alternative. But the nature of the alternatives depends on context. So for Lewis, the context sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions ln the domain of quantification.
     From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended (and reply) 1
     A reaction: A typical modern attempt to 'regiment' a loose term like 'context'. That said, I like the idea. I'm struck by how the domain varies during a conversation (as in 'what we are talking about'). Domains standardly contain 'objects', though.