Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Kant's Analytic' and 'How to Russell a Frege-Church'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

11989	For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: It is a tenet of Russell's theory that all expressions, and especially definite descriptions, whose denotation is dependent upon contingent circumstances must be eliminated.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], II)

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism

11990	'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating.

9668	'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m).
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar.

11991	If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
	Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism.
	From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
	A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)?

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

3570	Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts

2748	A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
	A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space

8592	Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: Because of the multidimensionality of space and unidimensionality of time, empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not.
	From: report of Jonathan Bennett (Kant's Analytic [1966], p.175) by Sydney Shoemaker - Time Without Change p.49 n4
	A reaction: An interesting observation, which could have been used by Samuel Clarke in his attempts to prove absolute space to Leibniz. The point does not prove absolute space, of course, but it seems to make a difference.