Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge' and 'Reality and Representation'

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4 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
12583 Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau]
     Full Idea: The truth condition of the belief is the 'normal' circumstances in which, given the learning process, it is biologically supposed to be present.
     From: David Papineau (Reality and Representation [1987], p.67), quoted by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 5.2
     A reaction: How do we account for a belief in ghosts in this story? The notion of 'normal' circumstances and what is 'biologically supposed' to happen don't seem very appropriate. This is the 'teleological' view of belief.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
22013 Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object [Reinhold]
     Full Idea: In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object, and relates it to both.
     From: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge [1791], p.78), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04
     A reaction: This is a reminder that twentieth century analytic discussions of perception were largely recapitulating late Enlightenment German philosophy. This is a very good definition of sense-data. I can think about my representations. Reinhold was a realist.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.