Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge' and 'Constitutional Code I'

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4 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
22013 Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object [Reinhold]
     Full Idea: In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object, and relates it to both.
     From: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge [1791], p.78), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04
     A reaction: This is a reminder that twentieth century analytic discussions of perception were largely recapitulating late Enlightenment German philosophy. This is a very good definition of sense-data. I can think about my representations. Reinhold was a realist.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
5271 Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
     Full Idea: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and science of music and poetry.
     From: Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code I [1827], p.139), quoted by J.R. Dinwiddy - Bentham p.114
     A reaction: Mill quoted this with implied outrage, but Bentham was attacking public subsidies to the arts when he said it. It is a basic idea in the debate on pleasure - that pleasures are only distinguished by their intensity, not some other value.