Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Logological Fragments II' and 'Leibniz'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis]
     Full Idea: He attains the maximum of a philosopher who combines all philosophies into a single philosophy
     From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 31)
     A reaction: I have found the epigraph for my big book! Recently a few narrowly analytical philosophers have attempted big books about everything (Sider, Heil, Chalmers), and they get a huge round of applause from me.
Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Now all learning is connected - thus philosophy will never be complete. Only in the complete system of all learning will philosophy be truly visible.
     From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 39)
     A reaction: Philosophy is evidently the unifying subject, which reveals the point of all the other subjects. It matches my maxim that 'science is the servant of philosophy'.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis]
     Full Idea: The philosopher lives on problems as the human being does on food. An insoluble problem is an indigestible food. What spice is to food, the paradoxical is to problems.
     From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 09)
     A reaction: Novalis would presumably have disliked Hegel's dialectic, where the best food seems to be the indigestible.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Philosophy ...is the art of producing all our conceptions according to an absolute, artistic idea and of developing the thought of a world system a priori out of the depths of our spirit.
     From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 19)
     A reaction: A lovely statement of the dream of building world systems by pure thought - embodying perfectly the view of philosophy despised by logical positivists and modern logical metaphysicians. The Novalis view will never die! I like 'artistic'.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Ought not logic, the theory of relations, be applied to mathematics?
     From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 38)
     A reaction: Bolzano was 19 when his was written. I presume Novalis would have been excited by set theory (even though he was a hyper-romantic).
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
     A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation).
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance')
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination.