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All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'Implications'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction

8210	Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida]
	Full Idea: To 'deconstruct' philosophy would be to think the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time determine what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into history by this motivated repression.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.5)
	A reaction: All of this type of philosophy is motivated by what I think of as (I'm afraid!) a rather adolescent belief that we are all being 'repressed', and that somehow, if we think hard enough, we can all become 'free', and then everything will be fine.

8211	The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida]
	Full Idea: The movement of 'différance', as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture etc.
	From: Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.7)
	A reaction: 'Différance' is a word coined by Derrida, and his most famous concept. At first glance, the concept of a thing which is the source of all differentiation sounds like a fiction.

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

3570	Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6451	Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: In the case of vision, sense data are a kind of inner picture show which itself only indirectly represents aspects of the external world.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.347)
	A reaction: I'm unsure whether this is correct. Russell says the 'roughness' of the table is the sense datum. If it is even a possibility that there are unsensed sense-data, then they cannot be an aspect of the mind, as Blackburn is suggesting they are.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

2866	A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: Reliabilism is open to the counterexample that a belief may be the result of some generally reliable process (a pressure gauge) which was in fact malfunctioning on this occasion, when we would be reluctant to attribute knowledge to the subject.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.327)
	A reaction: Russell's stopped clock that tells the right time twice a day. A good objection. Coming from a reliable source is very good criterion for good justification, but it needs critical assessment.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts

2748	A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
	From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
	A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

2864	The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: Critics say that intuitionism in ethics explains nothing, but may merely function as a disguise for prejudice or passion.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.198)
	A reaction: If someone claims to have an important moral intuition about something, you should carefully assess the person who has the intuition. I would trust some people a lot.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

2865	Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: Critics of prescriptivism have noted the problem that whilst accepting a command seems tantamount to setting oneself to obey it, accepting an ethical verdict is, unfortunately, consistent with refusing to be bound by it.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.300)
	A reaction: We nearly all of us accept that our behaviour should be better than it actually is, so we accept the oughts but fail to act. Actually 'refusing', though, sounds a bit contradictory.