Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types' and 'Scientific Realism'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
18170 The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
     Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if it is true, the ramification it is meant to cope with was pointless to begin with.
     From: Willard Quine (Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types [1967], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1
     A reaction: Maddy says the rejection of Reducibility collapsed the ramified theory of types into the simple theory.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
14933 Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: For Psillos, properties in mature science are defined by the laws in which they feature.
     From: report of Stathis Psillos (Scientific Realism [1999]) by J Ladyman / D Ross - Every Thing Must Go 3.5
     A reaction: This is a perfect example of the Humean approach getting everything the wrong way round. Laws are not primitives from which we derive our account of nature - they are generalisations built up from the behaviour of prior properties.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth").
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1
     A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that.