13 ideas
| 15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: The tenseless stance is quite clear: all times are equally real, so there are truth-makers for the future-tense statements, which consequently have determinate truth-values. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The tenseless view is linked to the B-series view, and to eternalism. This seems to mean that Aristotle took a tensed A-series view of time. |
| 6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved. |
| 15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: The view that evil is an illusion is self-refuting: that is, if there is no evil, the illusion that there is evil is certainly evil. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2) | |
| A reaction: [The idea comes from McTaggart, and Le Poidevin is quoting Dummett on it] |
| 15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: If the future is unreal, future individuals are ontologically problematic. Any apparent obligations towards them cannot, it seems, have an object. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 5) | |
| A reaction: I certainly 'feel' obligations to the future, but I am not sure whether I 'have' them. How far into the future do the extend? Should I care if homo sapiens is replaced by a different dominant species? |
| 15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: It would appear that any denial of the existence of continuants entails a denial of change. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Lowe for this view] Presumably we don't just accept change at face value, in that case. Indeed, views about temporal parts or time-worms give a different account of change (though perhaps a less convincing one). |
| 15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: A worry haunts the denial of tense: if tense is just mind-dependent, then minds at least themselves must be tensed. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2) |
| 15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: If we cannot coherently adopt a tensed perspective on events within fiction, then fictional discourse seems to provide an example of a tenseless language of before and after which is quite independent of the language of tense. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 7) |
| 15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: Events and objects that have ceased to exist change their A-series position (by becoming increasingly past), but persisting objects, in contrast, change their present B-series position. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1 n2) | |
| A reaction: The second half seems to imply a 'moving spotlight' of the present. This distinction is important, as it creates problems for all theories. The asymmetry seems weird. |
| 15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: It has been argued that the tensed view of time is actually committed to the unreality, not just of the future, but of the past also. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], Intro) | |
| A reaction: There seem to be strong and weak version here, since if you are committed to tenses, you are presumably committed to the possibility of truths about the past and future. The strong version (denying past and future) seems to make tenses pointless. |
| 15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: We appear to share a common now, but not a common here. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2) | |
| A reaction: Personally I take this to be quite a strong argument against the simplistic view that there is just something called 'spacetime', with no distinction of dimensions. |
| 15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: The new tenseless theory has given up Russell's attempt to reduce tensed statements (in terms of 'simultaneous with'), and instead give tenseless truth-conditions (in terms of indexicals). | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 3) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: Is God within, or outside time? How can God causally interact with the universe? How are 'all times present to God'? If the future is not real, can God not know the future? How would he then be omniscient? Does God know the truth of tensed assertions? | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 6) | |
| A reaction: This lot constitutes one of the main reasons why I cannot believe in God. In brief, the concept is incoherent. The metaphysical convolutions needed to reconcile these problems smack of the absurd aspects of medieval theology. |
| 16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Heretics are wolves …and therefore ought to be eradicated. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Sentences [1264], IV.13.2.3sc), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |