46 ideas
| 23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Love of truth is not a correct form of expression. Truth is not an object of love. It is not an object at all. …Truth is the radiant manifestation of reality. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: Wow! Love that one! |
| 9572 | Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: In the Gödelian realistic view of set theory the statement that there is a null set as the assertion of the existence in the real world of a set that has no members. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.6) | |
| A reaction: It seems to me obvious that such a claim is nonsense on stilts. 'In the beginning there was the null set'? |
| 9550 | We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Everything we know about the empty set is relational; we know that nothing is the membership relation to it. But what do we know about its 'intrinsic properties'? | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5) | |
| A reaction: Set theory seems to depend on the concept of the empty set. Modern theorists seem over-influenced by the Quine-Putnam view, that if science needs it, we must commit ourselves to its existence. |
| 9562 | In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: In simple type theory, there is a null set of type 1, a null set of type 2, a null set of type 3..... (Quine has expressed his distaste for this). | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.4) | |
| A reaction: It is bad enough trying to individuate the unique null set, without whole gangs of them drifting indistinguishably through the logical fog. All rational beings should share Quine's distaste, even if Quine is wrong. |
| 9573 | The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: In the structuralist view of sets, in structures of a certain sort the null set is taken to be a position (or point) that will be such that no other position (or point) will be in the membership relation to it. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.6) | |
| A reaction: It would be hard to conceive of something having a place in a structure if nothing had a relation to it, so is the null set related to singeton sets but not there members. It will be hard to avoid Platonism here. Set theory needs the null set. |
| 9551 | What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: What is it about the intrinsic properties of just that one unit set in virtue of which Bill Clinton is related to just it and not to any other unit sets in the set-theoretical universe? | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5) | |
| A reaction: If we all kept pet woodlice, we had better not hold a wood louse rally, or we might go home with the wrong one. My singleton seems seems remarkably like yours. Could we, perhaps, swap, just for a change? |
| 9549 | The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: The set theorist cannot tell us anything about the true relationship of membership. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5) | |
| A reaction: If three unrelated objects suddenly became members of a set, it is hard to see how the world would have changed, except in the minds of those thinking about it. |
| 9571 | ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: ZFU set theory talks about physical objects (the urelements), and hence is in some way about the physical world. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.5) | |
| A reaction: This sounds a bit surprising, given that the whole theory would appear to be quite unaffected if God announced that idealism is true and there are no physical objects. |
| 9563 | A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: A pack of wolves is not thought to go out of existence just because some member of the pack is killed. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.5) | |
| A reaction: The point is that the formal extensional notion of a set doesn't correspond to our common sense notion of a group or class. Even a highly scientific theory about wolves needs a loose notion of a wolf pack. |
| 9561 | The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Everything one needs to do with relations in mathematics can be done by taking a relation to be a set of ordered pairs. (Ordered triples etc. can be defined as order pairs, so that <x,y,z> is <x,<y,z>>). | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.2) | |
| A reaction: How do we distinguish 'I own my cat' from 'I love my cat'? Or 'I quite like my cat' from 'I adore my cat'? Nevertheless, this is an interesting starting point for a discussion of relations. |
| 9552 | Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: In first-order logic a set of sentences is 'consistent' iff there is an interpretation (or structure) in which the set of sentences is true. ..For Frege, though, a set of sentences is consistent if it is not possible to deduce a contradiction from it. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 02.1) | |
| A reaction: The first approach seems positive, the second negative. Frege seems to have a higher standard, which is appealing, but the first one seems intuitively right. There is a possible world where this could work. |
| 9553 | Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: With the invention of analytic geometry (by Fermat and then Descartes) physical space could be represented as having a mathematical structure, which could eventually lead to its axiomatization (by Hilbert). | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: The idea that space might have axioms seems to be pythagoreanism run riot. I wonder if there is some flaw at the heart of Einstein's General Theory because of this? |
| 10192 | We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride] |
| Full Idea: Chihara's 'constructability theory' is nominalist - mathematics is reducible to a simple theory of types. Instead of talk of sets {x:x is F}, we talk of open sentences Fx defining them. Existence claims become constructability of sentence tokens. | |
| From: report of Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004]) by Fraser MacBride - Review of Chihara's 'Structural Acc of Maths' p.81 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be approaching the problem in a Fregean way, by giving an account of the semantics. Chihara is trying to evade the Quinean idea that assertion is ontological commitment. But has Chihara retreated too far? How does he assert existence? |
| 23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
| Full Idea: What is sovereign in this world is determinateness, limit. Eternal Wisdom imprisons this universe in a network, a web of determinations. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growth') | |
| A reaction: Love this, because I take 'determination' to be the defining relationship in ontology. It covers both physical causation and abstract necessities. |
| 9559 | If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: If mathematics shares whatever confirmation accrues to the theories using it, would it not be reasonable to suppose that mathematics shares whatever disconfirmation accrues to the theories using it? | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 05.8) | |
| A reaction: Presumably Quine would bite the bullet here, although maths is much closer to the centre of his web of belief, and so far less likely to require adjustment. In practice, though, mathematics is not challenged whenever an experiment fails. |
| 9566 | No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Evidently, no scientific explanations of specific phenomena would collapse as a result of any hypothetical discovery that no mathematical objects exist. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 09.1) | |
| A reaction: It is inconceivable that anyone would challenge this claim. A good model seems to be drama; a play needs commitment from actors and audience, even when we know it is fiction. The point is that mathematics doesn't collapse either. |
| 9568 | I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: What I refer to as an 'equivalence class' (of line segments of a particular length) is an open sentence in my Constructibility Theory. I just use this terminology of the Platonist for didactic purposes. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 09.10) | |
| A reaction: This is because 'equivalence classes' is committed to the existence of classes, which is Quinean Platonism. I am with Chihara in wanting a story that avoids such things. Kit Fine is investigating similar notions of rules of construction. |
| 9547 | Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Causal theories of reference seem doomed to failure for the case of reference to mathematical entities, since such entities are evidently causally inert. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: Presumably you could baptise a fictional entity such as 'Polonius', and initiate a social causal chain, with a tradition of reference. You could baptise a baby in absentia. |
| 23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The aesthete's point of view is sacreligious, not only in matters of religion but even in those of art. It consists in amusing oneself with beauty by handling it and looking at it. Beauty is something to be eaten: it is a food. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Country') | |
| A reaction: She is endorsing the 'food' view against the 'handling' view. Beauty should nourish, she says. |
| 23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
| Full Idea: When the subject in question is the good, beauty is a rigorous and positive proof. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: Purest platonism! It is incomprehensible to say 'this thing is evil, but it is beautiful'. But there are plenty of things which strike me as beautiful, without connecting that in any way to moral goodness. |
| 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism') | |
| A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two? |
| 23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Humans have only one obligation: respect. The obligation is only performed if the respect is effectively expressed in a real, not a fictitious, way; and this can only be done through the medium of Man's earthly needs. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
| A reaction: She says man's 'eternal destiny' imposes this obligation. I read this as saying that you should not imagine that you treat people respectfully if you are merely polite to them. Col. Pickering and Eliza Doolittle! Respect is the supreme virtue. |
| 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |
| A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
| 23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
| Full Idea: To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognised need of the human soul. …Every human being needs to have multiple roots. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Uprootedness') | |
| A reaction: Agree. I think we are just like trees, in that we need roots to grow well, and plenty of space to fully flourish. Identifying those roots is the main task of parents and teachers. |
| 23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Order is the first need of all; it evens stands above all needs properly so-called. To be able to conceive it we must know what the other needs are. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Order') | |
| A reaction: This may be music to conservative ears, but you should examine Weil's other ideas to see what she has in mind. |
| 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights') | |
| A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind. |
| 23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Obligations are only binding on human beings. There are no obligations for collectivities, as such. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
| A reaction: I take it that 'as such' excludes the institutions created by collectivities, such as parliaments and courts. A nomadic tribe seems to have no duties, as a tribe, apart from mutual obligations among its members. Does this excuse crimes by the tribe? |
| 23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A man needs to be able to encompass in thought the entire range of activity of the social organism to which he belongs. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Responsibility') | |
| A reaction: She is urging the active involvement of citizens in decision making - for which they need appropriate knowledge. |
| 23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Participation in collective possessions is important. Where real civic life exists, each feels he has a personal ownership in the public monuments, gardens, ceremonial pomp and circumstances; sumptuousness is thus place within the reach of the poorest. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Collective') | |
| A reaction: OK with gardens. Dubious about fobbing the poor off with pomp. Monuments are a modern controversy, when they turn out to commemorate slavery and colonial conquest. I agree with her basic thought. |
| 23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Culture - as we know it - is an instrument manipulated by teachers for manufacturing more teachers, who, in their turn, will manufacture still more teachers. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
| A reaction: Lot of truth in this. We tend to view our greatest successes in students who become academics and teachers. Culture is very much seen as something which must be 'transmitted' to each new generation. |
| 23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Wherever a man is placed for life at the head of a social organism, he ought to be a symbol and not a ruler, as is the case with the King of England. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Obedience') | |
| A reaction: Nice to hear a radical French thinker endorsing an ancient British tradition! She may not be endorsing a lifelong head of state. Lifelong rulers are the main agents of totalitarianism. |
| 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance') | |
| A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty. |
| 23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A democracy where public life is made up of strife between political parties is incapable of preventing the formation of a party whose avowed aim is the overthrow of that democracy. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Opinion') | |
| A reaction: We have seen this around 2020 in the USA and the UK. Freedom is compulsory? Weil hates political parties (as did Rousseau). |
| 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy') | |
| A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree. |
| 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality. | |
| From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result. |
| 23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
| Full Idea: What is called Socialism tends to force everybody without distinction into the proletarian condition. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
| A reaction: For example, Weil favours maximising private house ownership, rather than communally owned housing. She is describing wholesale nationalisation. I would incline towards nationalisation only of all basic central services. |
| 23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The capitalists have betrayed their calling by criminally neglecting not only the interests of the people, not only those of the nation, but even their own. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
| A reaction: It is certainly true that the dedicated capitalist has little loyalty either to the people or to the nation. She doesn't spell out their failure of self-interest. I guess it produces a way of life they don't really want, deep down. |
| 23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
| Full Idea: By making money the sole, or almost the sole, motive of all actions, the sole, or almost the sole, measure of all things, the poison of inequality has been introduced everywhere. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Equality') | |
| A reaction: Presumably this dates right back to the invention of money, and then increases with the endless rise of capitalism. |
| 23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A right is effectual only in relation to its corresponding obligation, springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from others who consider themselves under an obligation to him. In isolation a man only has duties, and only others have rights. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
| A reaction: This seems correct, and obviously refutes the idea that people have intrinsic natural rights. However, it may be our sense of what nature requires which gives rise to the obligations we feel towards others. |
| 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law') | |
| A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'. |
| 23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
| Full Idea: In order to have the right to punish the guilty, we ought first of all to purify ourselves of their crimes. …But once this is accomplished we shall no longer feel the least desire to punish, or as little as possible and with extreme sorrow. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: Elsewhere she endorses punishment, as a social necessity, and a redemption for the wicked. This idea looks like a bit of a change of heart. She may be thinking of Jesus on the mote in someone's eye. |
| 23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The distinction between soldiers and civilians, which the pressure of circumstances has already almost obliterated, should be entirely abolished. Every individual in the population owes his country the whole of his strength, resources and life itself. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation') | |
| A reaction: Written in London in 1943. The year carpet bombing seriously escalated. The facts of warfare can change the ethics. |
| 23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Education - whether its object be children or adults, individuals or an entire people, or even oneself - consists in creating motives. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
| A reaction: I can't disagree. Intellectual motivation is simply what we find interesting, and there is no formula for that. A teacher can teach a good session, and only 5% of the pupils find it interesting. A bad session could be life-changing for one student. |
| 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion') | |
| A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'. |
| 9574 | 'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: An 'atomless gunk' is defined to be an individual possessing no parts that are atoms. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], App A) | |
| A reaction: [Lewis coined it] If you ask what are a-toms made of and what are ideas made of, the only answer we can offer is that the a-toms are made of gunk, and the ideas aren't made of anything, which is still bad news for the existence of ideas. |
| 23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |
| Full Idea: The proper function of religion is to suffuse with its light all secular life, public or private, without in any way dominating it. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation') | |
| A reaction: Even for the non-religious there is something attractive about some view of the world which 'suffuses our lives with light'. It probably describes medieval Christendom, but that contained an awful lot of darkness. |