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8083
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Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin]
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Full Idea:
Boole proposed to use the entire apparatus of a school algebra class, with operations such as addition and multiplication, methods to solve equations, and the like, to produce an algebra of thought.
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From:
report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.3
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A reaction:
The Stoics didn’t use any algebraic notation for their study of propositions, so Boole's idea launched full blown propositional logic, and the rest of modern logic followed. Nice one.
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8686
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Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend]
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Full Idea:
Boole (followed by Frege) began to turn logic from a branch of philosophy into a branch of mathematics. He brought an algebraic approach to propositions, and introduced the notion of a quantifier and a type of probabilistic reasoning.
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From:
report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854], 3.2) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics
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A reaction:
The result was that logic not only became more mathematical, but also more specialised. We now have two types of philosopher, those steeped in mathematical logic and the rest. They don't always sing from the same songsheet.
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22277
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Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter]
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Full Idea:
Boole's work was an early example of the axiomatic method, whereby intellectual economy is achieved by studying a set of axioms in which the primitive terms have multiple interpretations.
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From:
report of George Boole (The Laws of Thought [1854]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Boole'
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A reaction:
Unclear about this. I suppose the axioms are just syntactic, and a range of semantic interpretations can be applied. Are De Morgan's Laws interpretations, or implications of the syntactic axioms? The latter, I think.
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12298
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Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible.
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From:
Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6)
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A reaction:
See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning?
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12296
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4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position.
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From:
Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
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A reaction:
Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk.
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18882
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You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
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Full Idea:
Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was.
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From:
report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18
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A reaction:
This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death?
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12297
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Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant.
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From:
Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2)
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A reaction:
This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum.
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7590
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Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics).
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism')
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A reaction:
These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two?
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7589
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Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine.
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism')
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A reaction:
The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer.
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7593
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Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
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Full Idea:
Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality.
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From:
report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result.
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7587
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The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated.
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion')
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A reaction:
This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'.
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