Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Dictionary of Political Thought', 'On Motion' and 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'

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21 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14508 A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: A thisness is the property of being identical with a certain particular individual - not the property that we all share, of being identical with some individual, but my property of being identical with me, your property of being identical with you etc.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 1)
     A reaction: These philosophers tell you that a thisness 'is' so-and-so, and don't admit that he (and Plantinga) are putting forward a new theory about haecceities, and one I find implausible. I just don't believe in the property of 'being-identical-to-me'.
14511 There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: I have argued that there are possible cases in which no purely qualitative conditions would be both necessary and sufficient for possessing a given thisness.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 6)
     A reaction: Are we perhaps confusing our epistemology with our ontology here? We can ensure that something has identity, or ensure that its identity is knowable. If it is 'something', then it has identity. Er, that's it?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
12031 Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Essences have normally been understood to be constituted by qualitative properties.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 1)
     A reaction: I add this simple point, because it might be challenged by the view that an essence is a substance, rather than the properties of anything. I prefer that, and would add that substances are individuated by distinctive causal powers.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12034 If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: There is a temporal argument for the possibility of non-identical indiscernibles, if there could be a cyclical universe, in which each event was preceded and followed by infinitely many other events qualitatively indiscernible from itself.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
     A reaction: The argument is a parallel to Max Black's indiscernible spheres in space. Adams offers the reply that time might be tightly 'curved', so that the repetition was indeed the same event again.
14510 Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Similar to the argument from spatial dispersal, we can argue against the Identity of Indiscernibles from temporal dispersal. It seems there could be a cyclic universe, ..and thus there could be distinct but indiscernible events, separated temporally.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
     A reaction: See Idea 14509 for spatial dispersal. If cosmologists decided that a cyclical universe was incoherent, would that ruin the argument? Presumably there might even be indistinguishable events in the one universe (in principle!).
16455 Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: If God creates a globe reached by travelling two diameters in a straight line from another globe, this can be described as two globes in Euclidean space, or a single globe in a tightly curved non-Euclidean space.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 3)
     A reaction: [my compression of Adams's version of Hacking's response to Black, as spotted by Stalnaker] Hence we save the identity of indiscernibles, by saying we can't be sure that two indiscernibles are not one thing, unusually described.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14507 Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Is the world - and are all possible worlds - constituted by purely qualitative facts, or does thisness hold a place beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality?
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], Intro)
     A reaction: 'Thisness' and 'suchness' aim to capture Aristotelian notions of the entity and its attributes. Aristotle talks of 'a this'. Adams is after adding 'haecceities' to the world. My intuitive answer is no, there are no 'pure' identities. We add those.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11964 Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: According to a theory proposed by Adams, possible worlds are world-stories, that is maximally complete consistent sets of propositions which between them describe non-existent whole worlds.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979]) by George Molnar - Powers 12.2.2
     A reaction: Presumably this places an additional constraint on the view that a world is just a maximal set of propositions. It seems to require coherence as well as consistency. Suppose an object destroys all others objects. Is that a world?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16451 Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The anti-haecceitist thesis (according to Adams's version) is that all thisnesses are reducible to, or supervenient upon, suchnesses.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 3.5
11901 Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Moderate Haecceitism says that thisnesses and transworld identities are primitive, but logically connected with suchnesses. ..Extreme Haecceitism involves the rejection of all logical connections between suchness and thisness, for persons.
     From: report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been
     A reaction: I am coming to the conclusion that they are not linked. That thisness is a feature of our conceptual thinking, and is utterly atomistic and content-free, while suchness is rich and a feature of reality.
14512 Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: My position, according to which thisnesses and transworld identities are primitive but logically connected to suchnesses, we may call 'Moderate Haecceitism'.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 6)
     A reaction: The rather tentative connection to qualities is to block the possibility of Aristotle being a poached egg, which he (quite reasonably!) holds to be counterintuitive. It all feels like a mess to me.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
12032 Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
     Full Idea: Direct reference is commonly effected by the use of proper names and indexical expressions, and sometimes by what has been called (by Donnellan) the 'referential' use of descriptions.
     From: Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 2)
     A reaction: One might enquire whether the third usage should be described as 'direct', but then I am not sure that there is much of a distinction between references which are or are not 'direct'. Either you (or a sentence) refer or you (or it) don't.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
7590 Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
     Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics).
     From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism')
     A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
7589 Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine.
     From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism')
     A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
7595 The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights.
     From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights')
     A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
7588 Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society
     From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance')
     A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
7594 Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both.
     From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy')
     A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
7593 Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
     Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality.
     From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
7592 For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton]
     Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content.
     From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law')
     A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
7587 The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated.
     From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion')
     A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
12709 Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.