23 ideas
| 15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The truthmaker principle seems compelling, because if a proposition is true, something must be different from a world in which it is false. The principle makes this specific, by treating 'something' as a quantifier binding a variable in name position. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) | |
| A reaction: See Williamson for an examination of the logical implications of this. The point is that the principle seems to require some very specific 'thing', which may be asking too much. For a start, it might be the absence of a thing. |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Friends of the truthmaker principle should reject the Kripke semantics of varying domains. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
| A reaction: See other ideas from this paper to get a sense of what that is about. |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The converse Barcan formula does not allow any contingent truths at all to have a truthmaker. Once cannot combine the converse Barcan formula with any truthmaker principle worth having. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
| A reaction: One might reply, so much the worse for the converse Barcan formula, but Williamson doesn't think that. |
| 15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: In S5, necessity and possibility are not themselves contingent matters. This is plausible for metaphysical modality, since metaphysical possibility, unlike practical possibility, does not depend on the contingencies of one's situation. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §1) | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of why S5 might be preferable for metaphysics. See Nathan Salmon for the rival view. Williamson's point sounds pretty persuasive to me. |
| 15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: If the domain of propositional quantification is constant across worlds, the Barcan formula and its converse hold. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) | |
| A reaction: So the issue is whether we should take metaphysics to be dealing with a constant or varying domains. Williamson seems to favour the former, but my instincts incline towards the latter. |
| 15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The converse Barcan is at least plausible, since its denial says there is something that could fail to meet a condition when everything met that condition; but how could everything meet that condition if that thing did not? | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the response involves a discussion of domains, since everything in a given domain might meet a condition, but something in a different domain might fail it. |
| 18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: We should not assume that all quantification is either objectual or substitutional. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], p.262) | |
| A reaction: [see Prior 1971:31-4] He talks of quantifying into sentence position. |
| 15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: If quantification into sentence position is substitutional, then it is metaphysically neutral. A substitutionally interpreted 'existential' quantification is semantically equivalent to the disjunction (possibly infinite) of its substitution instances. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) | |
| A reaction: Is it not committed to the disjunction, just as the objectual reading commits to objects? Something must make the disjunction true. Or is it too verbal to be about reality? |
| 15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: We should not assume that all quantification is objectual or substitutional. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2) |
| 15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: If one uses 'fact' as a noun, the question arises why one cannot name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §2 n10) | |
| A reaction: What an intriguing thought! Must all nouns pass this test? 'The courage of the regiment was called Alfred'? |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Consideration of our ability to count objects across possibilities strongly favour both the Barcan formula and its converse. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §3) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that I can understand counting objects across possibilities. The objects themselves are possibilia, and possibilia seem to include unknowns. The unexpected is highly possible. |
| 7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
| Full Idea: For a statement to have (non-naturally) meant something, not merely must it have been 'uttered' with the intention of inducing a certain belief, but also the utterer must have intended an 'audience' to recognise the intention behind the utterance. | |
| From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.43) | |
| A reaction: This is Grice's famous and distinctive theory of meaning. I am struck by the problem of a password, which seems to have a quite different intention from its literal meaning. Also a speaker with two different audiences and opposite intentions. |
| 7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
| Full Idea: Only what I may call the primary intention of an utterer is relevant to the (non-natural) meaning of an utterance. | |
| From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.47) | |
| A reaction: This sounds okay for simple statements, but gets really tricky with complex statements, such as very ironic remarks delivered to an audience of diverse people. |
| 7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |
| Full Idea: To show that the criteria for judging linguistic intentions are very like the criteria for judging non-linguistic intentions is to show that linguistic intentions are very like non-linguistic intentions. | |
| From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.48) | |
| A reaction: This hint at the end of his paper is one of the key attractions of Grice's view. It offers an account of language that fits it into the world of animal communication and evolution. It never seems to quite capture the way meaning goes beyond intentions. |
| 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism') | |
| A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two? |
| 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |
| A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
| 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights') | |
| A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind. |
| 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance') | |
| A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty. |
| 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy') | |
| A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree. |
| 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality. | |
| From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result. |
| 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law') | |
| A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'. |
| 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion') | |
| A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'. |
| 15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: That there is just one necessary existent is surely false, for if x is a necessary, {x} is a distinct necessary existent. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula [1999], §1) | |
| A reaction: You would have to believe that sets actually 'exist' to accept this, but it is a very neat point. |