164 ideas
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Who cares what gets called 'philosophy'? It's my impression that most of what happened in philosophy before 1950 wouldn't qualify according to the present usage. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
| A reaction: A rather breath-taking remark. Fodor is, of course, a devotee of David Hume, and of Descartes, but he never seems to refer to Greeks at all. Personally I presume that if you aren't doing what Plato and Aristotle were interested in, it ain't philosophy. |
| 2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be constantly asking 'what is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of great soul, and unworthy of free men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1338b01) | |
| A reaction: Love this one! It is not just philosophers who keep hearing this question. Pure mathematics, history, literature, even carpentry if you are not going to be a carpenter. |
| 22521 | Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The method of inquiry that has guided us elsewhere is … that a composite must be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since these are the smallest parts of the whole. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a18) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle studies things, and aims to reveal their essential natures, so this is part of his method. You still have to grasp the essential natures of the atoms that compose the whole, however. To understand a city, understand people. |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Attempts to define a term frequently elicit necessary but not sufficient conditions for membership of its extension. This is called the 'X problem', as in 'kill' means 'cause to die' plus X. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1 n3) | |
| A reaction: Fodor is one of the great sceptics about definition. I just don't see why we have to have totally successful definitions before we can accept the process as a worthwhile endeavour. |
| 1570 | Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a09) | |
| A reaction: This may be a grand claim that we are the only animals that can think rationally, or a more obvious observation that we are the only ones that talk. Aristotle was well aware that logos is a very resonant word. |
| 1574 | Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Logos is for the purpose of clarifying the beneficial and the harmful and as a result the right and the wrong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a12) | |
| A reaction: I don't think this is asserting that reason can perceive values. Logos perceives the essential nature (and hence purpose) of each thing (including people), which indicates which are its good and bad states. |
| 2801 | Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a30) | |
| A reaction: I claim that the two distinguishing features of humanity are prescience and meta-thought, so I can't really disagree with this. |
| 22529 | Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A male, unless he is somehow formed contrary to nature, is by nature more capable of leading than a female. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1259b01) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful! The greatest of all philosophers offers us a perfect perpetration of the No True Scotsman Fallacy! If the question is 'are men natural leaders?', this seems to beg it. |
| 22571 | 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The sophistical argument 'if each is small, so too are all' is in one way true and in another false. For the whole composed of all the parts is not small, but it is composed of small parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1307b36) | |
| A reaction: If neurons can't think, then brains can't think. |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I'm inclined to think that 'and' is defined by its truth-table (and not, for example, by its 'inferential-role'). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Sounds right, on my general principle that something can only have a function if it has an intrinsic nature. The truth-table just formalises normal understanding of 'and', according to what it makes true. |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Names in thought (in contrast to, say, descriptions in thought) afford a primitive way of bringing John before the mind. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
| A reaction: I think the 'file' account of concepts which Fodor has now latched onto gives a wonderful account of names. They are simple if you haven't opened the file yet (like 'Louis', in Evans's example). |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Paderewski (as pianist and as politician) has two names in Mentalese. If you think there are two Paderewskis, it's important that what you get when you retrieve the pianist file differs from the politician file. You can then merge the two files. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
| A reaction: The same will apply to 'Hespherus' and 'Phosphorus'. We can re-separate the 'morning star' and 'evening star' files if we wish to discuss ancient Egyptian attitudes to such things. I love this idea of Fodor's. Explanations flow from it. |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The truth of P-and-Q is (roughly) a function of the truth of P and the truth of Q; but the consistency of P&Q isn't a function of the consistency of P and the consistency of Q. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.5 n33) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice deep issue. Fodor is interested in artificial intelligence at this point, but I am interested in the notion of coherence, as found in good justifications. Even consistency isn't elementary logic, never mind coherence. |
| 22525 | The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary for the whole to be prior to the part. For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a hand. For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity (so the hands and feet would no longer be the same). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a20) | |
| A reaction: It may be a mistake to ask which of these is 'prior'. If bricks make a wall, the whole depends on the parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. They continue to be possible parts of a wall (unlike severed feet). |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Statistically, logically, nomologically, conceptually, and metaphysically possible. That's all the kinds of possibility there are this week, but feel free to add others. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.3) | |
| A reaction: There's also epistemic possibility (possibility 'for all I know'), but I suppose that isn't the real thing. How about 'imaginative possibility' (possibility 'as far as I can imagine')? |
| 22587 | Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reason and understanding are our nature's end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1334b16) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be purpose of philosophy, and we should distinguish understanding from the mere accumulation of knowledge. |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Maybe some of your beliefs are inferred 'online' from what you have in your files, along with your inferential rules. 'Shakespeare didn't have a telephone' is a classic example, which we infer if the occasion arises. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
| A reaction: A highly persuasive example. There seem to be a huge swathe of blatantly obvious beliefs (especially negative ones) which may never cross our minds during an entire lifetime, but to which we certainly subscribe. |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Thought about the world is prior to thought about how to change the world. Accordingly, knowing that is prior to knowing how. Descartes was right, and Ryle was wrong. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: The classical example is knowing how to ride a bicycle, when few people can explain what is involved. Clearly you need quite a bit of propositional knowledge before you step on a bike. How does Fodor's claim work for animals? |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Pragmatism is perhaps the worst idea that philosophy ever had. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Not an argument, but an interesting sign of the times. Most major modern American philosophers, such as Quine, seem to fit some loose label of 'pragmatist'. I always smell a feeble relativism, and a refusal to face the interesting questions. |
| 22522 | To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we see how things grow naturally from the start, we would in this way, as in other cases, get the best theoretical grasp of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a24) | |
| A reaction: Observing the natural origins of a tulip doesn't help much (without microbiology), but he is discussing the nature of cities, and his suggestion seems good. |
| 22524 | The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What each thing is when its coming to be has been complete, this we say is the nature of each - for example, of a human, or of a horse, or of a household. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b32) | |
| A reaction: This works better for animate than for inanimate things. Aristotle is much clearer when we talk of the 'nature' of each thing, rather than its 'essence', because the latter has been blurred. I like 'essential nature'. |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Mental states have causal powers. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.3) | |
| A reaction: I quote this because it gives you the link between a general account of causal powers as basic to reality, and an active account of what the mind is. It has to be a key link in a decent modern unified account of the world. See Idea 12638. |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The ways in which different kinds of thing are similar to one another aren't, in general, similar to one another. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
| A reaction: Nice, but I think one would say that they lack similarity at the level of primary thought, but have obvious similarity (as concept-connectors) at the level of meta-thought. |
| 22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whatever is composed of a number of things, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, and this is present in animate things on the basis of their entire nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a28) | |
| A reaction: I'm assuming he is referring to animals, rather than plants. I'm not sure if this is a universal truth (e.g. in the case of slime moulds), but it is how I see human beings. The organism could not possibly function (esp. navigate) without central control. |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If the Representational Theory of Mind is true, then concepts are constituents of beliefs, the units of semantic evaluation, a locus of causal interactions among mental representations, and formulas in Mentalese. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1) | |
| A reaction: I like this aspect of the theory, but then I can't really think of a theory about how the mind works that doesn't make concepts central to it. |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Connectionism has no truck with mental representations; on the one hand, only the node labels in 'neural networks' have semantic content, and, on the other, the node labels play no role in mental processes, in standard formulations. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Connectionism must have some truth in it, yet mere connections can't do the full job. The difficulty is that nothing else seems to do the 'full job' either. Fodor cites productivity, systematicity, compositionality, logical form as the problems. |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Connectionist architectures provide no counterpart to the relation between a complex concept and its constituents. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3 n29) | |
| A reaction: This is the compositionality of thought, upon which Fodor is so insistent. Not that a theory of how the mind is built up from the body is quite likely to give you a theory about what thinking is. I try to keep them separate, which may be wrong. |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of associative theories of thinking is that they don't require thoughts to have syntactic structure. But they can't be right, since association doesn't preserve either sense or reference (to say nothing of truth). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3 n28) | |
| A reaction: This is using the empiricist idea that knowledge is built from mechanical associations to give a complete account of what thinking is. Fodor resolutely opposes it. |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: That there are ambiguities in English is the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
| A reaction: I have always been impressed by this simple observation, which is my main reason for believing in propositions (as brain events). 'Propositions' may just be useful chunks of mentalese. |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: We think in file names. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
| A reaction: This is Fodor's new view. He cites Treisman and Schmidt (1982) for raising it, and Pylyshyn (2003) for discussing it. I love it. It exactly fits my introspective view of how I think, and I think it would fit animals. It might not fit some other people! |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Mental representations can serve both as names for things in the world and as names of files in the memory. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
| A reaction: I am laughed at for liking this idea (given the present files of ideas before you), but I think this it is very powerful. Chicken before egg. I was drawn to databases precisely because they seemed to map how the mind worked. |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The frame problem is, precisely: How does one know that none of one's beliefs about Jupiter are germane to the current question, without having to recall and search one's beliefs about Jupiter? | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably good chess-playing computers have made some progress with this problem. The only answer, as far as I can see, is that brains have a lot in common with relational databases. The mind is structured around a relevance-pattern. |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If the content of a concept is its reference, we can stop worrying about Twin Earth. If there are no senses, there is no question of whether my twin and I have the same WATER concept. Our WATER concepts aren't even coextensive. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems like a neat solution. So do 'tap water' and 'holy water' have the same content to a Christian and non-Christian, when they co-refer to the contents of the font? |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I don't know how concepts are acquired. Nor do you. Nor does anybody else. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
| A reaction: This comes in the context of quietly modifying his earlier claim that concepts weren't acquired, because they were largely innate. Presumably we are allowed to have theories of concept acquisition? I quite like abstractionism. |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: What's learned are stereotypes. What's innate is the disposition to grasp such and such a concept (to lock to such a property) in consequence of having learned such and such a stereotype. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
| A reaction: This is the late Fodor much ameliorated view, after a lot of scoffing about the idea of the tin-opener being innate in all of us. There may be a suspicion of circularity here, if we ask what mental abilities are needed to form a stereotype. |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Pragmatism about concepts really is dead, and the only alternative about concept possession is Cartesianism. That is, it's the thesis that having concept C is being able to think about Cs (as such). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.2) | |
| A reaction: I like this. It is very hard to pick out from Fodor the bits where he is clearly right, but this seems to be one of them. I don't like the pragmatic or Wittgensteinian line that having concepts is all about abilities and uses (like sorting or inferring). |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: We think in file names, and file names are Janus-faced: one face turned towards thinking and the other face turned towards what is thought about. I do think that is rather satisfactory. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
| A reaction: So do I. I do hope the philosophical community take up this idea (which they probably won't, simply because Fodor is in the late stages of his career!). |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Cartesians think that concept individuation is prior, in order of analysis, to concept possession. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: Peacocke is someone who seems to put possession first, to the point where individuation is thereby achieved. The background influence there is Wittgenstein. I think I am more with Fodor, that concepts are entities, which need to be understood. |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers in droves have held that Frege cases are convincing arguments that concepts have not just referents but also senses. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.2) | |
| A reaction: [Frege cases are puzzles where simple reference seems to lead to confusion] I take the Fregean approach to concepts (of Dummett, Peacocke) to attempt to give an account of the sense, once the reference is decided. Idea 12629 gives Fodor's view. |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: How are we to understand the connection between the identity of a concept and its causal powers if concepts are (or have) senses? Answer: I haven't a clue. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the key to Fodor's attack on Peacocke and other Fregeans - that while they pay lip-service to the project of naturalising thought, they are actually committing us to some sort of neo-platonism, by losing the causal links. See Idea 12636. |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Supposing the mind to be conversant with senses can, maybe, provide for a theory of the intentionality of mental states; but it seems to shed no light at all on the nature of mental processes (i.e. of mental state transitions). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3) | |
| A reaction: I would track this back to Frege's hostility to 'psychologism'. That is, Fregeans don't care about Fodor's problem, because all their accounts (of mathematics, of logic, and of concepts) treat the subject-matter as self-contained sui generis. |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: You can think 'brown dog' without thinking 'cat', but you can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.3) | |
| A reaction: Fodor is talking about concepts in thought, not about words. The claim is that such concepts have to be compositional, and it is hard to disagree. |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: We needn't say that learning a stereotype is just a by-product of acquiring the concept; it could rather be a stage in concept acquisition. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
| A reaction: He rejects stereotypes because they don't give concepts the necessary compositionality in thought. But this idea would mean that children were incapable of compositionality until they had transcended the primitive stereotype stage. |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The same stereotype can give difference concepts; chickens are paradigmatic instances both of FOOD and of BARNYARD FOWL. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
| A reaction: And I'm guessing that lots of concepts could have two equally plausible stereotypes, even within a single mind. Stereotypes are interesting, but they don't seem to be the key to our understanding of concepts. |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Pure referentialism is the kind of semantics RTM requires (reference is the only primitive mind-world semantic property). ...So the content of a concept is its reference. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to say that the meaning of a concept is (typically) a physical object, which seems to be the 'Fido'-Fido view of meaning. It seems to me to be a category mistake to say that a meaning can be a cat. |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Atomism must be right about the individuation of concepts because compositionality demands it. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch1) | |
| A reaction: I suppose this seems right, though Fodor's own example of 'pet fish' is interesting. What is supposed to happen when you take a concept like 'pet' and put it with 'fish', given that both components shift their atomic (?) meaning in the process? |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: In the idea of learning concepts by 'abstraction', experiences of the instances provide evidence about which of the shared properties of things in a concept's extension are 'criterial' for being in the concept's extension. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.2 n6) | |
| A reaction: Fodor is fairly sceptical of this approach, and his doubts are seen in the scare-quotes around 'criterial'. He is defending the idea that only a certain degree of innateness in the concepts can get such a procedure off the ground. |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: 'Inferential-role semantics' claims that the meaning of a word (/the content of a concept) is determined by its role in inference. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1.2 n14) | |
| A reaction: Fodor is deeply opposed to this view. At first blush it sounds wrong to me, since there seems to be plenty of thought that can go on before inference takes place. Daydreamy speculation, for example. |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The representation of 'morning star' must be different from 'evening star' because their tokens differ in their causal powers. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3) | |
| A reaction: This is Fodor trying to avoid the standard Fregean move of proposing that there are 'senses' as well as references. See Idea 12629. If these two terms have the same extension, they are the same concept? They 'seem' to have two referents. |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I assume that there are two kinds of reference: reference to individuals and to properties. This means, from the syntactic point of view, that the vehicles of reference are exhaustively singular terms and predicates. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: The immediate possibility that comes to mind is plural quantification. See George Boolos, who confidently says that he can refer to 'some Cheerios' in his breakfast bowl, and communicate very well. He then looks to formalise such talk. |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: All you need for inferring from John's utterance to the world is the sort of thing that a semantics (i.e. referential semantics) provides. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
| A reaction: Fodor is very good at saying nice simple things like that. But it is not enough to infer what objects are being discussed. All the hard cases must be covered (denials of existence, reference to non-existence, intentional contexts, modal claims). |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Semantics is about constitutive relations between representations and the world. There is, as a matter of principle, no such thing as a psychological theory of meaning. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
| A reaction: The second sentence is in capital letters, but I am still not convinced. The classic difficulty seems to be that you have to use language to pick out the things in the world that are being referred to. Of course, at some point you just see the objects. |
| 22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Now, with the development of rhetoric, those who are able public speakers become popular leaders. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1305a12) | |
| A reaction: Demosthenes was an exact contemporary of Aristotle. Nowadays we are conscious of the 'dumbing down' by popular speakers, which is not the same as rhetoric. |
| 22574 | A community can lack self-control [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If lack of self-control exists at the level of a single individual, it also exists at the level of a city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1310a17) | |
| A reaction: A nice extension of the problem of akrasia. Was Britain declaring war in 1914 an act of akrasia? With hindsight it looks that way. Strong emotions about Belgium overcame sensible concern for the young men of Britain. |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: You can't think a plan of action unless you can think how the world would be if the action were to succeed; and thinking the world will be such and such if all goes well is thinking the kind of thing that can be true or false. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This is part of Fodor's attack on the pragmatic view of concepts (that they should be fully understood in terms of action, rather than of thought). I take Fodor to be blatantly correct. This is counterfactual thinking. |
| 2837 | Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nothing that is contrary to nature is fine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1325b09) | |
| A reaction: This seems a rather conservative view, since it rules out submarines, mountaineering and heart transplants.. It depends what we count as 'natural'. |
| 2824 | The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The many are the best judges of poetry and music; some judge some parts, some judge others, but their collective judgement is a verdict on all the parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b08) | |
| A reaction: No one seems to believe this in modern times, but it was a lot easier to spot good art before the invention of the camera, and Duchamp's wretched Fountain. |
| 2846 | Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We must regard music as a stimulus to virtue, capable of making a certain kind of character (just as gymnastic training produces a body of a certain type). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a20) | |
| A reaction: He makes a sustained claim for this, but without explicit justification. I am totally convinced that the music of Bach improves us, but I have no idea why. |
| 2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some say the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253b20) | |
| A reaction: Note that Aristotle gives good expression to the main view opposed to his own. History has clearly proved Aristotle wrong, and the present idea to be correct. Ditto the subjugation of women. |
| 22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Spirit [thumos] is what produces friendliness [philetikon], since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love [philoumen]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1327b39) | |
| A reaction: This is the same 'spirit' which Plato adds to reason and emotion for this three-part soul. There it seems more to denote fighting ability. Aristotle says it produces both fierceness and love. 'For the man de sword, for the woman de kiss'. |
| 2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b03) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is one of the main defendents of the idea that self-concern is an important part of morality. Stay fit! Improve your character! The mean between self-hatred and narcissism. |
| 22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10) | |
| A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour. |
| 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism') | |
| A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two? |
| 22557 | Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of a man must be identical to that of a citizen of the best city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1288a38) | |
| A reaction: Earlier he separated virtuous people from the best citizens, but here he reverses it. The interesting part is the role of the city in moulding the virtuous person. |
| 2841 | People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men become sound and good because of three things: these are nature, habit and reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332a38) | |
| A reaction: 'Habit' is the distinctively Aristotelian idea, but the most attractive part of his account is that habit and reason should combine. |
| 2829 | The law is the mean [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The law is the mean. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b04) | |
| A reaction: He probably intends to say that the law should be the mean. Since virtue is always the mean (i.e. what is appropriate), then it is almost tautological (for him) that the law is the mean. |
| 22590 | Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is concerned with enjoying, loving, and hating in the correct way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1340a14) | |
| A reaction: The context is a defence of music as a training of right feelings. |
| 2813 | It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1265a32) | |
| A reaction: That's a relief. Presumably this would achieve the correct mean in terms of indulgence, but all ruined by excesses in other areas. |
| 22553 | Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a virtue relating to communities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a38) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, given that we can also think of justice as between two individuals - in a contract, for example. Betrayal is an injustice. But for Aristotle the focus is on the constitution. |
| 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |
| A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
| 22561 | The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich seem to possess already the things for the sake of which unjust people do injustice, which is why the rich are called both noble and good and notable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1293b38) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem (at least in popular lore) to apply to those who acquired their wealth by unjust means, because by then injustice has become a habit. |
| 2808 | Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is an interest in common and a feeling of friendship between master and slave, wherever they are fitted for this relationship. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1255b12) | |
| A reaction: Very striking. His view that there are natural slaves, who are incapable of the good life, seems to count against this, but I suspect that he is forced to confront the facts in his own city. |
| 22586 | Only humans have reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The human being alone has reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b04) | |
| A reaction: Only in the last fifty years have we begun to grasp how clever larger animals are, and I would say that they consistently make rational choices, even if they can't articulate them. |
| 2803 | Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is by nature a political animal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a01) | |
| A reaction: It might be clearer if we said 'social animal'. We are certainly gregarious. Anyone who fails to be social is dismissed by Aristotle as not truly human. |
| 2820 | People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men have a desire for live together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1278b20) | |
| A reaction: He says that someone who doesn't want to live in community because they are wholly self-sufficient doesn't count as a normal human. |
| 22523 | The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The community, coming from several villages, when it is complete, is the city, once it has already reached (one might almost say) the limit of total self-sufficiency. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b27) | |
| A reaction: I suppose a group of villages might be self-sufficient, provided water supply and defences were secure. In a city it is all within easy reach. Each village can't have a full set of specialists. |
| 2805 | A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is sharing a common view in good and evil, justice and injustice, that makes a household and a state. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a17) | |
| A reaction: This idea comes up against the modern idea of pluralism (e.g. in Isaiah Berlin), which is inevitable in huge states with a lot of migration. |
| 22526 | People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a27) | |
| A reaction: Civil people should try hard to accommodate those who are anti-social. I'm not convinced that there is anyone who is wholly self-sufficient. |
| 22535 | Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We think friendship is the greatest good for cities, since this way people are least likely to engage in faction. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1262b07) | |
| A reaction: Earlier philosophers were deeply worried about 'faction', but we now accept the gangs of secretive hoodlums called political parties. I suspect the old view was right, but it's a bit late now. You can't engineer friendships (can you?). |
| 22584 | A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Communities should have some one thing that is common and the same for all the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally - for example, food, a quantity of territory, or something else of this sort. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a27) | |
| A reaction: In modern societies vast numbers of people own no land at all, and common land has dwindled. Maybe it is roads, buses and trains? |
| 22532 | A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Socrates adopts the hypothesis that it is best for a city to be as far as possible entirely one. …But it is evident that the more a city becomes one the less of a city it will be. For a city is in its nature a sort of multitude. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a14) | |
| A reaction: [He is referring to Plato's Republic] He says if a city wholly unifies it becomes like a household, and then a human being, rather than a city. A very interesting commitment to diversity in a city, based on its essential nature. Athens was very diverse. |
| 22581 | The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best defining mark of a city is the greatest excess of multitude with a view to self-sufficiency in living that can easily be surveyed as a whole. Let the size of the city, then, be determined in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1326b23) | |
| A reaction: Modern states have presumably far exceeded to self-sufficiency test. The requirement to be 'surveyed' presumably implies that the state can be controlled. Modern technology means almost no limit to such a size. |
| 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights') | |
| A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind. |
| 2431 | Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Observation tells us that every state is an association; and that every state is formed with a view to some good purpose. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a01) | |
| A reaction: Not so much a historical speculation, I think, as an assertion that it should be obvious what binds a state together, and hence has allowed it to endure. |
| 22548 | A city aims at living well [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The end of the city is living well. …It is for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280b38) | |
| A reaction: So the aim is not glory, conquest, colonisation, great buildings or other works. It is all of the citizens living well in their own way. This is the liberal ideal, from a long time ago. Spinoza is in tune with this. Fulfilling capabilities? |
| 22578 | The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The happy city is the one that is best and acts nobly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b29) | |
| A reaction: He applies almost identical criteria to the eudaimon individual and the eudaimon city. It is not the possession of virtuous qualities but the performing of fine deeds which matters. I want to be proud of what my country does. |
| 22577 | What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There should first be agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for (one might almost say) everyone, and then determine whether it is the same or distinct for all communally as for each separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a19) | |
| A reaction: Presumably 'almost' because slaves don't make the cut. But the inclusiveness is hugely important, and I take his second question to be the debate between communitarians and liberals. Communists and libertarians might get a look in. |
| 22579 | The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The courage, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance of a city have the same capacity and form [morphé] as those in which each human being who is said to be courageous, just, practically-wise, and temperate would share. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b33) | |
| A reaction: These are the four traditional Cardinal Virtues of ancient Greek culture. Aristotle defers to them, even though his account of the virtues is much broader. |
| 2832 | The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b25) | |
| A reaction: He knows that this cannot be fully achieved. It gets worrying when misfits are pressured into conformity. This sounds like Aristotle's less liberal side - though he accepts diversity. |
| 22566 | The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What the rich do to get more does more to destroy the constitution than what the people do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1297a10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because the wealthy have more power. In our society they have more control over the media and public opinions. The law should maintain the constitution, and the poor have no influence on the law. |
| 22580 | The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that the best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1324a23) | |
| A reaction: So what would Aristotle make of the modern welfare state, or the idea of a safety net for those who struggle? Should the state help the best life, and not just facilitate it? Education, infrastructure, health, communal activity…. |
| 2835 | Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1319b35) | |
| A reaction: An important issue for Aristotle, which we no longer seem to worry about. A constitution should aim, when it is created, to be acceptable enough to be durable. |
| 2973 | We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a14) | |
| A reaction: He takes this for granted, and it sounds right, but it is firmly contradicted by modern liberals (e.g. Rawls), who say the good life is for individuals to decide. |
| 22558 | Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A constitution is the way that cities order their offices, how they are distributed, what element is in control in the constitution, and what the end of each community is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1289a15) | |
| A reaction: Liberal constitutions tend to avoid stating what the end of the city is, because that is for the free citizens to decide. Nothing is said, it seems, about the territory or the population. |
| 22546 | A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are correct, whereas those that aim only at the advantage of the rulers are erroneous ones. For they are like the rule of a master, whereas a city is a community of free people. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279a17) | |
| A reaction: He is very keen on the full equality of all citizens (even if his concept of a citizen is narrow). This must be connected to his eudaimonist account of ethics. Everyone must flourish. I'm struck by his liberal values. |
| 2821 | The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The names for right constitutions (with their deviations) are monarchy (tyranny), aristocracy (oligarchy), and polity (democracy). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279b04) | |
| A reaction: I found it hard to pin down the meaning of 'polity', even though he makes it sound like the best constitution. Something like 'teamwork'. |
| 22544 | A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whoever is authorised to share in deliberative or judicial office …is a citizen of the relevant city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1275b18) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, and perhaps a bit surprising for us. We tend to assume that in a democracy the citizens are those allowed to vote, but he says what matters is being allowed to hold an office. Log cabin to White House. He's right. |
| 2818 | The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are many constitutions, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b28) | |
| A reaction: This is very striking support for the view that Aristotle's account of the virtues in 'Ethics' is merely a description of conventions (Athenian, presumably), rather than an appeal to nature. However, see his account of the soul, and human function. |
| 22545 | A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible for someone to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man. …[1278b02] In one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b33) | |
| A reaction: Thus confutes my simple summary of Aristotelian ethics as 'be a good citizen!'. He thinks leaders of communities must be excellent men. You can fulfil a role in the city (soldier, doctor, cleaner) without all-round excellence (see 1276b39). |
| 22563 | The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those in the middle [in wealth] are least inclined either to avoid rule or to be eager to rule, both of which things are harmful to cities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b12) | |
| A reaction: How nice to hear something good about the poor old middle classes - the hated bourgeoisie of the marxists, looked down on by the snobbish elite. They avoid the black market, and bribery for offices. |
| 22541 | Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is surely better to choose each new king not as now but rather in accord with his own life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a20) | |
| A reaction: When the British monarch was very powerful, the hereditary system was fairly disastrous. I get a thrill when a highly esteemed citizen is voted president of a country, such as Vaclav Havel in Czechia. British monarchs could be elected. |
| 22542 | People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is reasonable to expect that those who have bought office, that is, when they rule by having spent money, will become habituated to making a profit from it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b01) | |
| A reaction: Probably true, though money-grubbers are even happier if they can achieve office without expenditure. |
| 22583 | The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not correct to claim that guardians are to be harsh to those they do not know, since one should not treat anyone in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a07) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a criticism of Plato. Aristotle thinks people should be nice to one another! The ancient tradition of hospitality to strangers. |
| 2819 | The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1277b27) | |
| A reaction: If a person with wide social powers is to have practical wisdom, that will require extensive knowledge, in a way that local practical wisdom does not. |
| 22552 | The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich have a claim because they own a larger share of the land, and the land is something communal, and furthermore because they are for the most part more trustworthy when it comes to treaties. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a32) | |
| A reaction: It seems right that the rich give a stability and hence reliability to a society, which the more mobile poor cannot offer. But it is a minor point. |
| 22543 | In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the city is not small, it is more political and more democratic, if more people participate in the offices. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b11) | |
| A reaction: Not sure what 'more political' means. This is not to avoid corruption, but because it is best to have specialists in everything. All of the state functions should be of the highest standard. |
| 22572 | Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those holding the controlling offices should possess friendship towards the constitution, great capacity for that office, and the virtue and justice required by that constitution. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a33) | |
| A reaction: We need to remember that all officers in our democracy need to be fully committed to that system of government (which does not always seem to me to be the case). |
| 22539 | Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the election of officials is concerned, electing from the elected is dangerous. For if some are willing to combine, even if they are a relatively small number, the election will always turn out according to their wish. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a25) | |
| A reaction: The British Prime Minister is elected by the elected members of parliament of the majority party. (Boris Johnson is the current PM…). This idea reflects the great concern that earlier thinkers had about factions in politics. |
| 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance') | |
| A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty. |
| 22562 | Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294b07) | |
| A reaction: This idea has dropped out of modern politics, but is not ridiculous if the official is offered thorough civil service support. Presumably the term of office is fairly short. |
| 2823 | The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible that the many, not one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b01) | |
| A reaction: They may also crush everything that is good, if the many are gripped by absurd ideas (which they often are). Computer programmers are a good advert for this idea. |
| 22560 | Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In cities under democracies that are in accord with law, popular leaders do not arise, but rather it is the best citizens who take the front seats. Where the laws are not in control, however, there popular leaders arise. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1292a07) | |
| A reaction: This remark is, unfortunately, highly relevant to western politics in 2020. He says that flatterers rise to the top in these regimes. |
| 2826 | Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: As a larger amount of water is less easily polluted, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a30) | |
| A reaction: This was before the arrival of modern mass media, starting with tabloid newspapers. When many people are corrupted, it is much harder for society to recover its sanity. |
| 22567 | Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unconditionally equal, since, because they are equally free, they think they are unconditionally equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1301a28) | |
| A reaction: An interesting speculation. In Britain the origins of democracy seem tied to the granting of religious equality and freedom. |
| 22533 | If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where it is not possible for the same people always to rule, because all are in nature equal, it is also just for all to share in ruling. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a38) | |
| A reaction: This derives from his principle that the naturally superior should always rule the naturally inferior - though it sometimes looks as if ruling is the distinguishing mark of who is 'superior'. Democracy needs to equalise its citizens, where possible. |
| 2817 | It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of an office should solicit it. …One worthy of the office should hold it whether he wishes to or does not wish to. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a10) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea, and think it should be immediately implemented in the modern world, at every level of society. All leaders should be pushed to the front. The ambitious should be pulled to the back. |
| 22576 | No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is democratic to have no office be permanent. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b42) | |
| A reaction: Modern exceptions seem to be judges and civil servants. |
| 22549 | In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whether in every people this superiority of the majority to the few excellent people can exist is not clear. In some of them this cannot possibly be so, since the same argument would apply to wild beasts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b18) | |
| A reaction: He also gives reasons why it is plausible to think that the judgement of the majority is superior. It seems crucial that the majority have some education. Education is pointless if it is always overruled by the uneducated. |
| 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy') | |
| A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree. |
| 22575 | Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate democracy is a tyranny. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1312b05) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is rule by a majority which has been corrupted by a populist leader, resulting in things like witch hunts. |
| 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality. | |
| From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result. |
| 22531 | We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Our project is to get a theoretical grasp on which political community is superior to all others for people who are able to live as far as possible in the way they would pray to live. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b28) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a manifesto for liberalism. Presumably a community of free people starts from a superior position, and so the ideal community is the best that can be achieved from that starting point. A utopia of slaves is of no interest. |
| 22589 | Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One should in no way think that any citizen belongs to himself alone, but that all of them belong to the city, each being part of the city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a27) | |
| A reaction: Note that they do not belong entirely to the city. I take this as an expression of his liberalism, which reminds liberals that we are also parts of a community, with a common good, and can't just go our own way. |
| 22585 | Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A city must not be called happy by looking at just a part of it, but by looking at all of the citizens. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1329a22) | |
| A reaction: For example, it is wrong for a state to exult for being on the winning side in a major war, if it has meant misery for much of their own population. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (1520) does not excuse the misery of vagrants. |
| 22564 | Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Community is fitted to friendship, since enemies do not wish to share even a road in common. But a city tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar, which especially holds of those in the middle. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b24) | |
| A reaction: The surprising emphasis on friendship in 'Ethics' turns out to have great importance in 'Politics'. Friendship is the cement of a community, and the constitution must maximise good conditions for friendships. |
| 22565 | The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The political community that is due to those in the middle class is best, and cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and strong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b34) | |
| A reaction: He specifically connects this to the doctrine of the mean in 'Ethics'. It seems easier for rulers from the middle classes to command universal respect, as the extremes tend to despise one another. What does he mean by 'strong'? |
| 22534 | People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is held communally by the most people gets the least care. For people give most thought to what is their own, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to each of them to give. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261b33) | |
| A reaction: That is, they care about the bit they contributed (I think). On a train, would people with feet on the seats do the same in their own home? Yes, probably! Caring about what is communal must be a cultural consensus. Pride in the NHS. |
| 22538 | Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who own and share property communally have far more disagreements than those who own their property separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b23) | |
| A reaction: The reduction of disagreements is not a trivial matter, when designing a constitution for a happy community. 'Good fences make good neighbours'. |
| 22536 | There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The land might be held separately, while the crops grown on it are brought into a communal store, …or the land might he held and farmed communally, while the crops are divided for private use, …or they could both be held communally. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a02) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle says that examples exist of both of the first two cases. I would go for public land and privately divided crops. Capitalists end up with private land and private crops. |
| 22530 | Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to look to the constitution in educating both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be excellent, and its women too. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b14) | |
| A reaction: He consistently classes women as inferior, so it is a bit surprising to find that women need to be educated. They are not full citizens, but are part of the community, of which all parts need to be excellent. |
| 21358 | Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A human being who belongs, by nature, not to himself but to another is, by nature, a slave. ...Those whose function happens to be the use of their bodies (when this is the best that can be achieved) are slaves by nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a09-), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 099 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle trying to derive what ought to be from the 'nature' of each thing. Clearly, though, this was not the best that can be achieved. And why are labourers slaves, but not computer programmers or economists? |
| 20092 | One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One sort of freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b1) | |
| A reaction: This is a lovely challenge to our modern idea of liberty, which largely consists of being left alone. |
| 2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In an oligarchy or a democracy it pays to give equality, or even preference, to those who participate in the constitution less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a27) | |
| A reaction: A very nice idea. Every constitution will give priority to some group, even if it is all of the adults. So it should therefore have clauses supporting the others (e.g. children). |
| 2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality; the strong reck nothing of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1318b05) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be merely an observation of the facts. He certainly doesn't want to deny them justice and equality, merely because that motivates them. |
| 2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the definitive principle of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy. …each of these is grounds for claiming equality. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294a11) | |
| A reaction: By 'aristocratic' Aristotle means living at a high level of virtue (unlike oligarchs, who are just rich). Hence we can all aspire to be aristocrats. |
| 22550 | It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Neither to give a share nor to receive a share is a fearful thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b28) | |
| A reaction: It is striking that he includes equality in giving, as well as in receiving. Paying taxes is a privilege, because it shows your equality as a citizen. |
| 22568 | Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Inferiors engage in faction in order to be equal, while equals do so in order to be superior. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1302a30) | |
| A reaction: In Britain that seems to trade unions in the first case, and the Conservative Party in the second case. Aristotle dislikes faction, but he's stuck with it because he insists on freedom. |
| 22569 | The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The people of Heraea replaced election with selection by lot because those who electioneered were getting elected. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1303a14) | |
| A reaction: Maybe electioneering can distort sensible choices, but good choices need good knowledge of the candidates. It is much harder in large communities. |
| 2814 | Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to propose that the property of the citizens should be equal. … but there should also be equality of education. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a38) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how you achieve full equality in education, if some of the blighters work harder. A useful reminder that achieving 'equality' is far from a simple matter. |
| 22540 | Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A leveling could be very quickly achieved by the rich giving but not receiving dowries, and the poor receiving but not giving them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266b02) | |
| A reaction: Consequence: the daughters of the rich are never again allowed to marry (or even speak to) poor people. The modern approach is graduated income tax, presumably because there are reasonably accurate records of income. |
| 2828 | Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Law is intelligence without appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a31) | |
| A reaction: Neat, but no laws would be needed if there were no appetites. The idea has a nice Kantian feeling to it, though - of rising into the space of pure reason. |
| 22537 | Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is better for property to be private, but for its use to be made communal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a38) | |
| A reaction: This is because people take more care of what is private. Modern large land owners usually allow hikers, but not gardeners. |
| 2825 | The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In a state the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community; and all men believe that justice means equality in some sense. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b17) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's idea of justice seems closer to finding what is appropriate than it does to mere equality of treatment. |
| 22527 | Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a political community's order. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a36) | |
| A reaction: This seems to agree with Plato, who identifies justice with harmony (in individuals as well as in communities). Fascism, however, tries to impose order without justice. Maybe justice is the health of the community. |
| 22573 | The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If what is just is not the same in all constitutions, there must be differences in the virtue of justice as well. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a37) | |
| A reaction: This problem has recently arisen when the state of China took full control of the westernised colony of Hong Kong. Liberals look for a more absolute concept of justice. What is justice in a slave colony? |
| 22547 | Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice seems to be equality - not for everyone, but for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality - not for everyone, but for unequals. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280a11) | |
| A reaction: He is specific that slaves, women and children are unequals, but I'm not sure how much inequality there is among the free men. In virtue theory, some men are clearly greatly superior to others. Is there a cut off point for equality? |
| 22556 | Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Laws that are in accord with habits have more control and deal with things that have more control than do written laws. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b05) | |
| A reaction: This is the problem of bringing the law into disrepute, by insisting on behaviour that goes against the grain. But there are laws, such as those against racism, which are designed to break bad habits. |
| 2816 | If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Easy change from established laws to new laws means weakening the power of the law. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1269a23) | |
| A reaction: This is a reasonable justification for sometimes insisting on the letter of the law, even though some degree of injustice results. |
| 2806 | Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a31) | |
| A reaction: Sounds true, but it is extraordinary that the virtues of mankind only emerge when we are artificially contrained. Rousseau disagreed with this. |
| 22551 | Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The laws, when correctly laid down, should be in control, and the ruler, whether one or many, should have control only of those matters on which the laws cannot pronounce with exactness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b01) | |
| A reaction: It is obvious that general laws cannot cover each individual cases. Aristotle doesn't yet have the concept of an independent judiciary to handle this problem, so this is not true separation of powers. |
| 22554 | It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is said that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a10) | |
| A reaction: To say we shouldn't follow laws because they are all vague would be crazy. A vague border is still a border. Laws need interpretation, and judgement of appropriate application. |
| 2827 | It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a19) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that the law is sensible. An exception would be when a wise ruler takes over a very corrupted state, which has passed evil laws. Nelson Mandela. |
| 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law') | |
| A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'. |
| 2840 | The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Another thing that should be a common charge on the whole state is the worship of the gods. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1330a08) | |
| A reaction: If religion ceases to be a priority, is there some equivalent which should replace it? National sports teams? National theatre, or orchestras? National parks? |
| 2811 | A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A state is a plurality which must depend on education to bring about its common unity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b33) | |
| A reaction: He also says that diversity is an essential aspect of a city, so I don't think he expects education to achieve perfect unity. |
| 2847 | The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might perhaps suppose that serious activity in childhood may have for its aim the amusement of the complete and adult man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a30) | |
| A reaction: It is very Aristotelian to have a concept of 'serious' childhood play. I doubt whether Nichomachus had much fun. Aristotle thinks the good amusement of adults is very important. |
| 22588 | A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Since the end of the whole city is a single end, it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all, and that its supervision must be communal, not private as it is at present. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a21) | |
| A reaction: But the end of the city is for all individual citizens to flourish, not for the group to flourish. So presumably education must be tuned to individual capacities and needs, and not just focus on some communal good. |
| 2842 | Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b10) | |
| A reaction: Habit is almost an education of the body rather than of the mind, like a pianist making their fingers learn to play a piece. |
| 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion') | |
| A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'. |
| 2844 | Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If an unwanted child is conceived, abortion should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1335b24) | |
| A reaction: A salient reminder that ancient people also had to think about the question of abortion. Some cultures seem unbothered by concerns, but not Arfistotle. |
| 2809 | If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made plants and animals for the sake of man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1256b20) | |
| A reaction: That was a rather fast move! If a tiger eats a man, how do we explain that? Why are some plants poisonous? Pebbles on a beach seem to have no purpose. |
| 2800 | The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every instrument will be made best if it serves not many purposes but one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b03) | |
| A reaction: Sound like a good general truth, but not a universal truth. Swiss army knife. Ship in a bottle. Pins. Wrapping paper. |
| 2836 | God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: God himself is not blessed and happy on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b24) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle was famous for saying that external goods are important for the virtuous human life, so this idea is his corrective, which shows that they are of limited importance. |
| 2802 | Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b26) | |
| A reaction: A common Greek observation. It is more significant that we anthropomorphise the thinking of the gods, as well as their physiques and banquets. |