13 ideas
| 5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
| A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis. |
| 5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
| A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance. |
| 5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view). | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1) | |
| A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views. |
| 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism') | |
| A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two? |
| 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |
| A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
| 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights') | |
| A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind. |
| 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance') | |
| A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty. |
| 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy') | |
| A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree. |
| 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality. | |
| From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result. |
| 23420 | In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: The fact of pluralism means that the hope of political community must be abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in affirming a general and comprehensive conception of the good. | |
| From: John Rawls (The Idea of Overlapping Consensus [1987]), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
| A reaction: A moderate pluralism might be manageable, but strong, diverse and dogmatic beliefs among sub-groups probably make it impossible. |
| 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law') | |
| A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'. |
| 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion') | |
| A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'. |
| 5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it. | |
| From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8) | |
| A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish. |