14 ideas
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is by the natural light that the axioms of mathematics are recognised. If we take away the same quantity from two equal things, …a thing we can easily predict without having experienced it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], p.189) | |
A reaction: He also says two equal weights will keep a balance level. Plato thinks his slave boy understands halving an area by the natural light, but that is just as likely to be experience. It is too easy to attribut thoughts to a 'natural light'. |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: That which is necessary for something does not constitute its essence. Air is necessary for our life, but our life is something other than air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Bravo. Why can't modern philosophers hang on to this distinction? They seem to think that because they don't believe in traditional essences they can purloin the word for something else. Same with the word 'abstraction'. |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Intelligible truth is independent of the truth or of the existence outside us of sensible and material things. ....It is generally true that we only know necessary truths by the natural light [of reason] | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: A nice quotation summarising a view for which Leibniz is famous - that there is a tight correlation between necessary truths and our a priori knowledge of them. The obvious challenge comes from Kripke's claim that scientists can discover necessities. |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We use the external senses ...to make us know their particular objects ...but they do not make us know what those sensible qualities are ...whether red is small revolving globules causing light, heat a whirling of dust, or sound is waves in air. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: These seems to be exactly the concept of secondary qualities which Locke was promoting. They are unreliable information about the objects we perceive. Primary qualities are reliable information. I like that distinction. |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It can be said that there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or that which understands. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Queen Charlotte [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Given that Leibniz is labelled as a 'rationalist', this is awfully close to empiricism. Not Locke's 'tabula rasa' perhaps, but Hume's experiences plus associations. Leibniz has a much loftier notion of understanding and reason than Hume does. |
3178 | A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Block, by Rey] |
Full Idea: Ned Block proposes a machine (a 'blockhead') which could pass the Turing Test just by looking up responses in a vast look-up table. | |
From: report of Ned Block (works [1984]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 5.3 | |
A reaction: Once you suspected you were talking to a blockhead, I think you could catch it out in a Turing Test. How can the lookup table keep up to date with immediate experience? Ask it about your new poem. |
7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics). | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism') | |
A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two? |
7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |
A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights. | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights') | |
A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind. |
7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance') | |
A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty. |
7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both. | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy') | |
A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree. |
7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality. | |
From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result. |
7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content. | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law') | |
A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'. |
7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. | |
From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion') | |
A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'. |