47 ideas
| 1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: You cannot divide anything (such as the decad) into many parts, because as soon as you separate the first part, you are no longer dividing the original. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.215) |
| 1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Dogmatists define proof as "an argument which, by means of agreed premises, reveals by way of deduction a nonevident inference". | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.135) |
| 12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Philo (of Megara) says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,' as for instance the syllogism 'If it is day, I converse,' when in fact it is day and I am conversing. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.110) | |
| A reaction: Russell endorses this, and Rumfitt quotes it as the classic case of denying that there is any modal aspect (such as 'logical necessity') involved in logical consequence. He labels it 'material or Philonian consequence'. |
| 1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died; so he was either dead when he was alive, or he was twice dead when he was dead. So he didn't die. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.111) | |
| A reaction: One of my favourites. Of all the mysteries facing us, the one that boggles me most is how anything can happen in the 'present' moment, if the present is just the overlap point between past and future. |
| 20660 | At one level maths and nature are very similar, suggesting some deeper origin [Wolfram] |
| Full Idea: At some rather abstract level one can immediately recognise one basic similarity between nature and mathematics ...this suggests that the overall similarity between mathematics and nature must have a deeper origin. | |
| From: Stephen Wolfram (A New Kind of Science [2002], p.772), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 17 'Philosophy' | |
| A reaction: Personally I think mathematics has been derived by abstracting from the patterns in nature, and then further extrapolating from those abstractions. So the puzzle in nature is not the correspondence with mathematics, but the patterns. |
| 1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If an argument leads to confessedly absurd conclusions, we should not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument, but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.252) | |
| A reaction: cf. G.E.Moore. Denying that you have a hand seems to be an absurdity, but I'm not sure if I can give a criterion for absurdity in such a case. One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. |
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Honey appears to sceptics to be sweet, but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.20) |
| 1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Just as you can't know if a portrait of Socrates is good without seeing the man, so when the intellect gazes on sensations but not the external objects it cannot know whether they are similar. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.75) |
| 1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.258) |
| 1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12) |
| 1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120) |
| 1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119) |
| 1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32) |
| 1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47) |
| 1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59) |
| 1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109) |
| 1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101) |
| 1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96) |
| 1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103) |
| 1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80) |
| 1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203) |
| 1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234) |
| 1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204) |
| 1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109) |
| 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism') | |
| A reaction: These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two? |
| 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism') | |
| A reaction: The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer. |
| 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The idea of a right seems to be as basic as any other; we might even define justice in terms of it, as the disposition to accord to every person his rights. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'rights') | |
| A reaction: I am inclined to think that a set of fairly pure values (such as equality, kindness, sympathy, respect) must be in place before the idea of a right would occur to anyone. Aristotle has a powerful moral sense, but rights for slaves don't cross his mind. |
| 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Conservatives have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of society | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'allegiance') | |
| A reaction: This provokes the famous slogan of "My country - right or wrong!" However, the issue here is not going to be decided by a consequentialist analysis, but by a view a of human nature. I think I would want to carefully prise allegiance apart from loyalty. |
| 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The paradox of democracy (emphasised by Rousseau) is that I am compelled by my belief in democracy to embrace conflicting - perhaps even contradictory - opinions. If I believe A, and the majority vote for B, I am committed to enacting them both. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'paradox of democracy') | |
| A reaction: The paradox would have to be resolved by qualifying what exactly one is committed to by being a democrat. I would say I am committed to the right of my opponents to enact a policy with which I disagree. |
| 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality. | |
| From: report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result. |
| 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: For the positivist, law is law by virtue of its form; for the naturalist, by virtue of its content. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'law') | |
| A reaction: Clearly a perverse and 'unnatural' social rule (backed by government and implied force) is a 'law' in some sense of the word. It is hard to see how you could gain social consensus for a law if it didn't appear in some way to be 'natural justice'. |
| 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion') | |
| A reaction: This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'. |
| 1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14) |
| 1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21) |
| 1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18) |
| 1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27) |
| 1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution). | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15) |
| 1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Self-movement must move in some particular direction, but if it pushes it will be behind itself, and if it pulls it will be in front of itself. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.68) | |
| A reaction: This is the same as Aquinas's First Way of proving God's existence. |
| 1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If bodies, and the places and times when they are said to move, are divided into infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to find anything which will initiate the first movement. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.76) |
| 1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If objects are reducible to atoms, and each thing passes in an atomic time with its own first atom into an atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.77) |
| 20659 | Space and its contents seem to be one stuff - so space is the only existing thing [Wolfram] |
| Full Idea: It seems plausible that both space and its contents should somehow be made of the same stuff - so that in a sense space becomes the only thing in the universe. | |
| From: Stephen Wolfram (A New Kind of Science [2002], p.474), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 17 'Philosophy' | |
| A reaction: I presume the concept of a 'field' is what makes this idea possible. |
| 1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.141) |
| 1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: There can't be a time when there was no time, so time is not limited; but unlimited time means past and present are non-existent (so time is limited to the present), or they exist (which means they are present). Time does not exist. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.142) |
| 1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Time is clearly divisible (into past, present and future), but it can't be, because a divisible thing is measured by some part of itself (divisions of length), but the two parts must coincide to make the measurement (e.g. present must coincide with past). | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.143) |
| 1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: How shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.3) |
| 1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The existence of God is not pre-evident, for if it was the dogmatists would have agreed about it, whereas their disagreements show it is non-evident, and in need of demonstration. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.6) |
| 1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If God had forethought for all, there would be no evil in the world, yet they say the world is full of evil. And if he forethinks some things, why those and not others? | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.9) |