9 ideas
| 22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129) | |
| A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist? |
| 3425 | Reduction has been defined as deriving one theory from another by logic and maths [Nagel,E, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Ernest Nagel defines reduction as the possibility of deriving all laws of one theory by logic and mathematics to another theory, with appropriate 'bridging principles' (either definitions, or empirical laws) connecting the expressions of the two theories. | |
| From: report of Ernest Nagel (The Structure of Science [1961]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.213 | |
| A reaction: This has been labelled as 'weak' reduction, where 'strong' reduction would be identity, as when lightning is reduced to electrical discharge. You reduce x by showing that it is y in disguise. |
| 22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270) | |
| A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition. |
| 22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042) | |
| A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible. |
| 22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness. |
| 22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058) | |
| A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen? |
| 23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
| Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
| A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
| 23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
| A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
| 18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
| A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |