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8329
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Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
There is a fundamental choice between the realist approach to causation which says that the relation is immediately given in experience, and the view that causation is a theoretical relation, and so not directly observable.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
Even if immediate experience is involved, there is a step of abstraction in calling it a cause, and picking out events. A 'theoretical relation' is not of much interest there if no observations are involved. I don't think a choice is required here.
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23257
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We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling]
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Full Idea:
Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust.
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From:
report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2
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A reaction:
The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal?
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8324
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The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
Causal states of affairs encompass causal laws, and causal relations between events or states of affairs; two key questions concern the relation between causal laws and causal relations, and the relation between these and non-causal affairs.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
This is the agenda for modern analytical philosophy. I'm not quite clear what would count as an answer. When have you 'explained' a relation? Does calling it 'gravity', or finding an equation, explain that relation? Do gravitinos explain it?
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8328
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Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
The temporal parts of an electron (for example) are causally related, but this relation does not involve any transfer of energy or momentum. Causation cannot be identified with physical energy relations, and physicalist reductions look unpromising.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
This idea, plus Idea 8327, are their grounds for rejecting Fair's proposal (Idea 8326). It feels like a different use of 'cause' when we say 'the existence of x was caused by its existence yesterday'. It is more like inertia. Destruction needs energy.
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8325
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The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
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Full Idea:
The dominant view is that causal laws are more basic than causal relations, with relations being logically supervenient on causal laws, and on properties and event relations; some, though, defend the singularist view, in which events alone can be related.
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From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
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A reaction:
I am deeply suspicious about laws (see Idea 5470). I suspect that the laws are merely descriptions of the regularities that arise from the single instances of causation. We won't explain the single instances, but then laws don't 'explain' them either.
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4800
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Natural laws result from eliminative induction, where enumerative induction gives generalisations [Cohen,LJ, by Psillos]
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Full Idea:
Cohen contends that statements that express laws of nature are the products of eliminative induction, where accidentally true generalisations are the products of enumerative induction.
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From:
report of L. Jonathan Cohen (The Problem of Natural Laws [1980], p.222) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §7.1
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A reaction:
The idea is that enumerative induction only offers the support of positive instances, where eliminative induction involves attempts to falsify a range of hypotheses. This still bases laws on observed regularities, rather than essences or mechanisms.
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