17 ideas
20100 | Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: The classical liberals agreed on a basic list of freedoms: of opinion (including religion), of private life, of expression, and of property | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 9) | |
A reaction: Mill is main articulator of this. Modern neo-liberals focus on economic freedom. Neither of them seem to make freedom of opportunity central, though I suspect our modern Liberal Party would. |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5 | |
A reaction: We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap. |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Davidson (1980 ess 1) agreed with Anscombe that if a person Fs by G-ing, then her act F = her act G. For example, if someone accidentally alerts a burglar, by deliberately turning on a light, by flipping a switch, these are all the same action. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1.2 | |
A reaction: I would have thought there was obviously a strong conventional element in individuating actions, depending on interest. An electrician is only interest in whether the light worked. The police are only interested in the disturbance of the burglar. |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The early Davidson championed the approach that we explain the idea of having an intention by providing an account of what it is to act with an intention. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Rowland Stout - Action 7 'Conclusion' | |
A reaction: This eliminates the distinction between a prior intention, and the intention that maintains a process such as speech. It sounds almost behaviourist. |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Whenever someone does something for a reason he can be characterised as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards action of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963], p.3-4), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 3 'The belief-' | |
A reaction: This is the earlier Davidson roughly endorsing the traditional belief-desire account of action. He is giving a reductive account of reasons. Deciding reasons were not reducible may have led him to property dualism. |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
Full Idea: Davidson defends the simple thesis that the reason for which an action is done is the one that causes it, …which means that agency is possible only if mental causation is possible. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.127 |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Davidson argues that the best interpretation of the teleological character of reason explanations is an intepretation in causal terms. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.4 | |
A reaction: That is, this is the explanation of someone doing something 'because' they have this reason (rather than happening to have a reason). Smith observes that other mental states (such as beliefs) may also have this causal power. |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
Full Idea: Only the Humean theory is able to make sense of reason explanation as a species of teleological explanation, and one may accept that reason explanations are teleological without accepting that they are causal. | |
From: comment on Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.6 | |
A reaction: That is, reasons can give a purpose to an action, and thereby motivate it, without actually causing it. I agree with Smith. I certainly don't (usually, at least) experience reasons as directly producing my actions. Hume says desires are needed. |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In Davidson's earlier approach, intentional action requires causation by reasons. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Weakness' | |
A reaction: A very Kantian idea, and one that seems to bestow causal powers on something which I take to be highly abstract. Thus Davidson was wrong (but in a nice way). |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: It can be argued (by Davidson) that far from it being the case that reasons for and causes of action are quite distinct, reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Lowe argues against this view. The rival views to Davidson would be either that reasons are no more than desires-plus-beliefs in disguise, or that the will causes actions, and strong reasons carry a great weight with the will. I like the will. |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
20097 | The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: In the classical liberal tradition freedom meant freedom from external control, and equality meant equality before the law. In the welfare state (of Beatrice Webb) freedom was reinterpreted as freedom from want, and equality as equality of opportunity. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: The authors call this the 'third revolution' in government, after 17th century centralisation and early 19th century accountability. Tawney 1931 is the key text. |
20099 | For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: For the communists the proletariat rather than the state was the locomotive of history. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: I feel increasingly reluctant to support any party which appears to mainly represent the interests of a single social class, no matter how large that class may be. An attraction of liberalism is that it makes no reference to class. |
20098 | Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: The central laissez-faire conceit is that capitalism is a self-correcting mechanism. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
A reaction: This was Keynes's rather left-wing criticism of standard capitalist views. These resurfaced in the 1980s with mantras about the virtues of 'market forces'. |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |
20096 | Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
Full Idea: Roman law entrenched property rights. | |
From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 1 Intro) | |
A reaction: Normally attributed to Locke, so this is a good corrective. Was the principle gradually forgotten before Locke? |