10 ideas
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Logicians have come increasingly to realise that logic is the science not of the intension, but of the extension of terms. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I take this to be because the notion of a 'set' is basic, which is defined strictly in terms of its members. This move is probably because we can be clear about extensions, but not intensions. Tidiness is no substitute for complex truth. |
19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa] |
Full Idea: The best definition of reliabilism seems to be: the agent has evidence, and bases the belief on the evidence, and the actual conditional reliability of the belief on the evidence is high enough. | |
From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is Comesaņa's own theory, derived from Alston 1998, and based on conditional probabilities. |
19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa] |
Full Idea: If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem'). | |
From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1) | |
A reaction: That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge. |
19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa] |
Full Idea: The reliabilist has the problem of finding a principled way of selecting, for each token-process of belief formation, the type whose reliability ratio must be high enough for the belief to be justified. | |
From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.3) | |
A reaction: The question is which exact process I am employing for some visual knowledge (and how the process should be described). Seeing, staring, squinting, glancing.... This seems to be called the 'generality problem'. |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash. |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Personally I regard allegiance, in the manner of Hegel, as prior to the recognition of individual rights. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Bibliog) | |
A reaction: Scruton notoriously generates rather right-wing views from this basis, but it is also the basis of communitarianism, which can take a softer form. It seems to me self-evident that rights cannot be the prime concept in a society. What society? |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Rights are enforced in the name of justice, whereas power is enforced come what may. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably rights can be claimed as well as enforced, and the notion of a natural right is at least a discussable concept, as in the 'right' of self-defence. Scruton offers us a very right-wing definition of rights. |