10 ideas
15717 | Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The problem with the Axiom of Choice is that it allows an initiate (by an ingenious train of reasoning) to cut a golf ball into a finite number of pieces and put them together again to make a globe as big as the sun. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 9) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how this works (and I think it was proposed by the young Tarski), but it sounds like a real problem to me, for all the modern assumptions that Choice is fine. |
15712 | 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: You have 1 and 0, something and nothing. Adding gives us the naturals. Subtracting brings the negatives into light; dividing, the rationals; only with a new operation, taking of roots, do the irrationals show themselves. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Mind') | |
A reaction: The suggestion is constructivist, I suppose - that it is only operations that produce numbers. They go on to show that complex numbers don't quite fit the pattern. |
15711 | The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Nameless') | |
A reaction: Nice. That is, the rationals may be dense (you can always find another one in any gap), but the irrationals are continuous (no gaps). |
15714 | 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The 'commutative' laws say the order in which you add or multiply two numbers makes no difference; ...the 'associative' laws declare that regrouping couldn't change a sum or product (e.g. a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c ). | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
A reaction: This seem utterly self-evident, but in more complex systems they can break down, so it is worth being conscious of them. |
15715 | 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The 'distributive' law says you will get the same result if you first add two numbers, and then multiply them by a third, or first multiply each by the third and then add the results (i.e. a · (b+c) = a · b + a · c ). | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
A reaction: Obviously this will depend on getting the brackets right, to ensure you are indeed doing the same operations both ways. |
15713 | The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The claim that no number is greater than a million is confirmed by the first million test cases. | |
From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Extrapolate from this, and you can have as large a number of cases as you could possibly think of failing to do the inductive job. Love it! Induction isn't about accumulations of cases. It is about explanation, which is about essence. Yes! |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion. | |
From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro | |
A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard. |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |