6 ideas
| 22820 | Early Romantics sought a plurality of systems, in a quest for freedom [Hösle] |
| Full Idea: It was an early Romantic idea that there is necessarily a plurality of systems in which individuality is expressed; for a complete system would destroy freedom. | |
| From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 7) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why you are free because you are locked into system that differs from that of other people. True freedom seems to be either no system, or continually remaking one's own system. Why is such freedom valuable? Freedom v truth? |
| 23801 | Biosemantics says content is useful mapping from a producer to a consumer system [Millikan, by Schulte] |
| Full Idea: Millikan's 'biosemantic' view is that representations stand midway between producer and consumer systems. The represented states of affairs (the content) maps onto the second system, and thus enable its proper function. | |
| From: report of Ruth Garrett Millikan (Varieties of Meaning [2002]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 4.4 | |
| A reaction: These meets my standard objection to all functional theories (e.g. of mind), that observing relations and functions tells you nothing about what it actually is. Millikan seems to explain the role of content, but says nothing about its actual nature. |
| 23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
| Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
| A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
| 23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
| A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
| 18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
| A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |
| 22819 | In the 18th century history came to be seen as progressive, rather than cyclical [Hösle] |
| Full Idea: The turning point in the history of the philosophy of history occurs in the eighteenth century, when the ancient cyclical model of Vico is superseded by the idea of progress. | |
| From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 6) | |
| A reaction: He says that Hegel merely inherited this progressive view, rather than creating it. I'm not sure how widely held the cyclical view was. I don't recognise it in Shakespeare. Science and technology must have suggested progress. |