Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Taking Rights Seriously', 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
7068 If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley]
     Full Idea: If what is mistaken in much contemporary philosophy is its infatuation with science, which leads to scientism, then the equally mistaken rejection of science leads to obscurantism.
     From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Clearly a balance has to be struck. I take philosophy to be a quite separate discipline from science, but it is crucial that philosophy respects the physical facts, and scientists are the experts there. Scientists are philosophers' most valued servants.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
7075 To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Against the Kantian division of a priori and empirical, Fichte offered activity of the subject, Schelling offered natural force, Hegel offered Spirit, Schopenhauer the Will, Nietzsche power, Marx praxis, Freud the unconscious, and Heidegger offered Being.
     From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001])
     A reaction: The whole of Continental Philosophy summarised in a sentence. Fichte and Schopenhauer seem to point to existentialism, Schelling gives evolutionary teleology, Marx abandons philosophy, the others are up the creek.
7069 The French keep returning, to Hegel or Nietzsche or Marx [Critchley]
     Full Idea: French philosophy since the 1930s might be described as a series of returns: to Hegel (in Kojčve and early Sartre), to Nietzsche (in Foucault and Deleuze), or to Marx (in Althusser).
     From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], Ch.2)
     A reaction: An interesting map. The question might be why they return to those three, rather than (say) Hume or Leibniz. If the choice of which one you return to a matter of 'taste' (as Nietzsche would have it)?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9286 Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
     Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
     From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
     A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
9285 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
     Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function.
     From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro)
     A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
7067 Food first, then ethics [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Food first, then ethics.
     From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], 8857)
     A reaction: This is not a dismissal of philosophy, but a key fact which ethical philosophers must face up to. See Mr Doolittle's speech in Shaw's 'Pygmalion. It connects to the debate c.1610 about whether one is entitled to grab someone's plank to avoid drowning.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
23104 Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes]
     Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin.
     From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1
     A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
23257 We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust.
     From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2
     A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal?
18621 Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'.
     From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn)
     A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche.