14 ideas
| 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The paradigmatic referring devices are singular terms, denoting particular items. In English these include proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and a few others. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: This list provides the agenda for twentieth century philosophy of language, since this is the point where language is supposed to hook onto the world. |
| 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: This suggests a nice connection to Fodor's account of intentional thinking. The whole package sounds right to me (though the representations need not be 'symbolic', or in mentalese). |
| 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: How could we know whether a sentence is verifiable unless we already knew what it says? | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 8) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a devastating objection to verificationism. Lycan suggests that you can formulate a preliminary meaning, without accepting true meaningfulness. Maybe verification just concerns truth, and not meaning. |
| 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Could I not know the use of an expression and fall in with it, mechanically, but without understanding it? | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: In a foreign country, you might successfully recite a long complex sentence, without understanding a single word. This doesn't doom the 'use' theory, but it means that quite a lot of detail needs to be filled in. |
| 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Proper names pose a problem for the "use" theorist. Try stating a rule of use for the name 'William G. Lycan'. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: Presumably it is normally used in connection with a particular human being, and is typically the subject of a grammatical sentence. Any piece of language could also be used to, say, attract someone's attention. |
| 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: A Davidsonian truth theory will not be able to distinguish the meaning of a sentence containing 'renate' from that of one containing 'cordate'. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: One might achieve the distinction by referring to truth conditions in possible worlds, if there are possible worlds where some cordates are not renate. See Idea 7773. |
| 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions can be taken to be the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the meaning can't be complete possible worlds, so this must be a supplement to the normal truth conditions view proposed by Davidson. It particularly addresses the problem seen in Idea 7770. |
| 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
| Full Idea: The possible worlds construal affords an elegant algebra of meaning by way of set theory: e.g. entailment between sentences is just the subset relation - S1 entails S2 if S2 is true in any world in which S1 is true. | |
| From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: We might want to separate the meanings of sentences from their entailments (though Brandom links them, see Idea 7765). |
| 7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: It is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a metaphor. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.40) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very nice and true generalisation, even though Davidson mentions "no man is an island" as a counterexample. We thirst for meaning, and switch to a second meaning when the first one looks peculiar. |
| 7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.29) | |
| A reaction: This is good news for literature studies courses. Davidson's point is that the metaphor itself only gives you a literal meaning, so it doesn't tell you how to interpret it. It seems an attractive proposal. |
| 7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.30) | |
| A reaction: This pronouncement must be the result of Davidson anguishing over the truth conditions for metaphors, which are usually either taken to have a 'metaphorical meaning', or to be abbreviated similes. He solved his problem at a stroke! Plausible. |
| 23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
| Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
| A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
| 23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
| A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
| 18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
| From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
| A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |