80 ideas
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Syntactical methods of proof (e.g.'natural deduction') have regard only to the formal structure of premises and conclusions, whereas semantic methods (e.g. truth-tables) consider their possible interpretations as expressing true or false propositions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This is highly significant, because the first method of reasoning could be mechanical, whereas the second requires truth, and hence meaning, and hence (presumably) consciousness. Is full rationality possible with 'natural deduction'? |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
Full Idea: By 'substance', in the context of the mind, we mean a persisting object or thing which can undergo changes in its properties over time while remaining one and the same thing. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A neat account of the traditional philosophical notion of a substance. It invites the obvious question of how you know that a thing is the same if all of its properties seem to have changed (as with Descartes' wax). Epistemology discredits ontology. |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The causal theory of beliefs seems condemned to treat all beliefs as true, which is absurd, …and we do not want to say that tomorrow's rain 'causes' today's belief that it will rain tomorrow. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Fodor. A false belief might be caused by reality if one had one's internal wires crossed, and a belief about the future might be caused by events happening now. This theory is not dead. |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the 'I' in 'I think' no more serves to pick out a certain object than does the 'it' in 'it is raining'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A nice example to remind us that not all English pronouns have genuine reference. You could reply that 'it' does refer, to the weather; or that you can switch to 'you think', but not to 'they/we are raining'. |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'ecological' approach to perception resists the idea that our brains have to construct information about our environment by inference from sensations, because the information is already present in the environment, available to well-tuned senses. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: The psychologist J.J.Gibson is the source of this view. This pushes us towards direct realism, and away from representative theories, which are based too much on problems arising from illusions (which are freak cases). Interesting. |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A bare knowledge that tables have a particular form will not enable one to recognise a table visually, unless one knows how something with such a form typically appears or looks from a variety of different angles. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather significant point, if we are trying to work out how concepts and models operate in the process of perception. Lowe points out that with electrons, we have some knowledge of the form, but no capacity for recognition. |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Computational psychologists object to the 'ecological' approach to perception (with its externalist, direct realist picture), because it leaves us entirely in the dark as to how our senses 'pick up' information about the environment. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: I find myself siding with the computationalists, but then I have always favoured the representational view of perception among philosophers. Lowe comments that both approaches neglect actual experience. We construct models, e.g. of London. |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: When two objects, one of them rotated, are compared, the length of time it takes the subjects to determine they are of the same shape is roughly proportional to the size of angle of rotation, ...which suggests analogue modes of representation. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: I consider this to be highly significant for our whole understanding of the mind, which I think of as a set of models organised like a database. Think about the weather, phenomenalism, London, the Renaissance, your leg. You play with models. |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says that we have either veridical perception or else hallucination, but there is no common element in the form of a 'perceptual experience' which would be present in either case and merely caused in different ways. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: McDowell is associated with this view. It seems to be another attempt to get rid of sense-data. It seems odd, though, to say that a hallucination of a dagger has nothing in common at all with experience of real daggers. Why did hallucinations evolve? |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A causal theorist can be a 'direct realist' in the sense that he can hold that the only objects of perception are external objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: There still seem to be problems with perceiving reflections, or very distant objects (the time-lag problem), or perceiving 'secondary' qualities. |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we don't need to have perceptual experiences in order to see things (as 'blindsight' might suggest), the causal theory of perception cannot be correct. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is because the causal theory implies a chain of events culminating in experience as the last stage. There is no suggestion, though, that unconscious perception would be non-causal, as it bypasses all the problems about consciousness. |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: How could one paraphrase the sense-datum report 'I am aware of a red square sense-datum to the right of a blue round sense-datum' in an adverbial way? 'I am appeared to redly and squarely and roundly and bluely'? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: It is a nice question, but not an instant refutation of the adverbial theory. Vision may be a complex tangle of modes of seeing things, rather than a large collection of sense-data. As I look out of the window, how many sense-data do I experience? |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Memory of facts is quite different from memory of practical skills, and both are quite distinct from what is sometimes called personal or autobiographical memory. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: If we accept David Marshall's proposal (Idea 6668), then all of the mind is memory, of many different types, and so the above analysis will be much too simple. |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Psychologists point out that illusions almost always occur in unnatural environments in which subjects are prevented from exploiting the natural interplay between perception and action. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: It has always struck me that philosophers make a great deal out of illusions, but I don't think I have ever had one. I don't know anyone who has seen a non-existent dagger. |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
Full Idea: Maybe we should say that IF regularities are stable, only then is induction a reliable procedure. | |
From: Alistair Mitchell (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a very good proposal. In a wildly unpredictable reality, it is hard to see how anyone could learn from experience, or do any reasoning about the future. Natural stability is the axiom on which induction is built. |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In evolutionary explanations you may explain a population trait in terms of what it is for the sake of an individual, or explain it in terms of what it was for the sake of in earlier generations, but never in terms of what the trait is for the sake of. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 2 'Functions') | |
A reaction: So my ears are for the sake of my ability to hear, but that does not explain why I have ears. Should we say there is 'impersonal teleology' here, but no 'personal teleology'? Interesting. |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Not all explanation is causal. Explaining the beauty of a painting is not explaining why something happened. or why a move in chess is illegal, or why the square root of two is not a rational number. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Argument') | |
A reaction: It is surely plausible that the illegality of the chess move is caused (or 'determined', as I prefer to say) by the laws created for chess. The painting example seems right, though; what determined its configuration (think Pollock!) does not explain it. |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Externalism maintains that our minds 'reach out' into our physical environment, at least in the sense that our states of mind can depend for their very existence and identity upon what things that environment contains. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the externalist view. Does this mean that a brain in a vat would not have a mind? Does a photograph 'reach out' to its subject-matter? |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Philosophy of mind seems to address the questions of whether the mind is distinct from the body, and whether the mind has properties, such as consciousness, which are unique to it. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Simple enough, but the modern debate seems to centre on the second question, which is here stated nice and clearly. Of course, wild garlic has a unique smell, but that doesn't quite qualify as a 'unique property'. Are the properties of mind unpredictable? |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is 'phenomenal' consciousness, which is what is distinctive of qualitative states of experience, and 'apperceptive' consciousness, which is awareness of all of one's mental states, including beliefs and desires. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: I am not convinced that this distinction is sharp enough to be useful, though I approve of trying to analyse the components of consciousness. Is there 'intentional' consciousness? Desires, and even beliefs, can have qualities. |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some physiologists maintain that the human brain is equipped with two different visual systems, an older one and a more recently evolved one, only the first of which is intact in blindsight subjects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Ramachandran (on TV) suggested that lizards lack the newer system, and therefore may not actually be conscious. The proposal of two systems seems to make nice sense of an odd phenomenon. We clearly have a non-conscious route to visual information. |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
Full Idea: I suggest that persons are selves - that is, they are subjects of experience which have the capacity to recognised themselves as being individual subjects of experience; selves possess reflexive self-knowledge. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I would express this as 'a capacity for meta-thought'. I increasingly see that as the hallmark of homo sapiens, and the key quality I look for in assessing the intelligence of aliens. Very intelligent people are exceptionally self-aware. |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If, as seems intuitively plausible, I could survive with my brain detached from the rest of my body, I most certainly cannot be identical with my whole body. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A key mistake is to treat the notion of 'I' as all-or-nothing. My surviving brain is much more like me than my surviving kidney, but the notion of my brain saying to my family 'it's me in that jar over there' sounds wrong. It is a bit of me. |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems impossible for me to acquire perfectly general concepts of thought and feeling, applicable to other people as well as to myself, purely from some queer kind of mental self-observation, but this is what the observational model demands. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I don't understand the word 'queer' here, which seems part of an odd modern fashion for denigrating introspection. It is right, though, that the acquisition of general mental concepts from my mind seems to depend on analogy, which is a suspect method. |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Every human language appears to have a word or expression equivalent to the English word 'I'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: If this is true (what is his evidence?) I take it to be very significant support for what I take to be obvious anyway, that the mind/brain has a central controlling core, which understands and decides, and which is the most valued part of us. |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The idea that 'qualia' exist but are causally inert is difficult to sustain: for if they are causally inert, how can we even know about them? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: The brain might be a special case. I can't know about a 'causally inert' object in my kitchen, but I might know about it if in some way I AM that object. Personally, though, I think everything that exists is causally active. |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One must already understand what it means to ascribe to someone a belief that it is raining in order to be able to generate the items on the list of rain-behaviour, so the list cannot be used to explain what it means to ascribe to someone such a belief. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This is thought by many to be a decisive objection of behaviourism, because it makes the enterprise hopelessly circular. If I put up an umbrella when it was dry, you would probably infer that I believed it was raining. |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A computer executing its program is not equivalent to the English-speaker in the Chinese Room, but to the combination of the English-speaker and the operation manual. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Searle replies that there would be no understanding even if the person learned the manual off by heart. However, if we ask 'Is there any understanding of the universe in Newton's book?' the answer has to be 'yes'. So the manual contains understanding. |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Functionalism seems to commit us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This goes with the tendency of functionalism to imply epiphenomenalism - that is, to make the intrinsic character of mental states irrelevant to thinking. I'd love to eavesdrop on two zombies in an art gallery. |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems that functionalism can recognise no difference between my colour experiences and yours, in the case of spectrum inversion, suggesting that it fails to characterise colour experience adequately, by omitting its qualitative character. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This is a standard objection to functionalism, but then it is an objection to most other theories as well. Even dualism just offers a mystery as to why experiences have qualities. Observing a patch of red involves about three billion brain connections. |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Functionalism has nothing positive to say about the intrinsic properties of mental states, only something about their relational properties. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This seems to me highly significant. All references to function (e.g. in Aristotle) invite the question of what enables something to have that function. Maybe the core question of philosophy of mind is whether mental states are intrinsic or relational. |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The rejection of type-type identity and acceptance of token-token identity is referred to as 'non-reductive physicalism', and is usually link with the idea that mental state types are not identical with physical state types, but 'supervene' on them. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: A nice summary of the view (built on the arguments of Davidson) which has also become known as 'property dualism'. Personally I regard it as dangerous nonsense. If two things 'supervene' on one another, the first question to ask is: why? |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Physicalists will, it seems, be committed to the notion of narrow content, because if a person and their counterpart are neurological duplicates, they must exemplify the same mental state types, and thus possess beliefs with the same contents. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Very important. How many philosophers currently believe in both wide content and reductive physicalism? However, if content is physical brain-plus-environment, we might reply that the whole package must be identical for same content. Cf Idea 7884! |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Eliminative materialism may be accused of incoherence, insofar as is threatens to eliminate reason and truth along with the propositional attitudes. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: Lowe does not enlarge on this intriguing suggestion. I don't see a threat to truth, if brain events represent the outer world, as they can do it more or less well. Logic is built on truth. Reason grows out of logic. Evidence seems okay… Hm. |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some behaviourists have held the view that thinking just is, in effect, suppressed speech. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: He cites J.B.Watson. This would imply that infants and animals can't think. Introspecting my own case, I don't believe it. When I am navigating through a town, for example, I directly relate to my mental map; I see little sign of anything verbal. |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In the 'cab problem' (what colour was the cab in the accident?) most people estimate an 80% probability of it being a blue cab, but Bayes' Theorem calculates the probability at 41%, suggesting people put too much faith in eyewitness testimony. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: For details of the 'cab problem', see Lowe p.200. My suspicion is that people get into a tangle when confronted with numbers in a theoretical situation, but are much better at it when faced with a real life problem, like 'who ate my chocolate?' |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Base rate neglect' (attending to the witness or evidence, and ignoring background information) is responsible for doctors exaggerating the significance of positive results in diagnosis of relatively rare medical conditions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of the clearest cases where people's behaviour is irrational, though I suspect that people are much more rational about things if the case is simple and non-numerical. However, people are very credulous about wonderful events. |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'Frame Problem' in artificial intelligence is how to write a program which not only embodies people's general knowledge, but specifies how that knowledge is to be applied appropriately, when circumstances can't be specified in advance. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: As Lowe observes, this is a problem, but not necessarily an impossibility. There should be a way to symbolically map the concepts of knowledge onto the concepts of perception, just as we must do. |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Lack of motivation and curiosity are perhaps the most fundamental reason for denying that computers could be, in any literal sense, rational beings. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I don't see why programmers couldn't move those two priorities to the top of the list in the program. When you switch on a robot, its first words could be 'Teach me something!', or 'Let's do something interesting!' Every piece of software has priorities. |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The Turing test is open to the objection that it is inspired by behaviourist assumptions and focuses too narrowly on verbal evidence of intelligence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This is part of the objection that the test exhibits human chauvinism, and robots and aliens are wasting their time trying to pass it. You need human behaviour, especially speech, to do well. Inarticulate people can exhibit high practical intelligence. |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The leading naturalistic theories of what it is that confers a specific content upon a given attitudinal state are the causal theory, and the teleological theory, both of which contain serious difficulties. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: 'Causal' theories (Fodor) say the world directly causes content; 'teleological' theories (Millikan, Papineau) are based on the evolutionary purpose of content for the subject. I agree that neither seems adequate… |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The implication of considerations of Twin Earth cases is that even beliefs about the properties of kinds of stuff are implicitly indexical, or context-dependent, in character. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This is a significant connection, between debates about the nature of indexicals (such as 'I' and 'this') and externalism about content generally. Is there no distinction between objective reference and contextual reference? |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
Full Idea: We use the same that-clause ('that snow is white') to specify the contents of both a person's utterances and of their beliefs, because it is the same proposition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Certainly to say 'he believes that we should declare war' seems to refer to something non-linguistic, but it doesn't demonstrate that anything concrete or real is being referred to. It may be an abstract account of dispositions and desires. |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If propositions are abstract entities, more like the objects of mathematics, it seems mysterious that states of mind should depend for their causal powers upon the propositions which allegedly constitute their 'contents'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], 70) | |
A reaction: Compare standard objections to Platonic Forms (e.g. Idea 3353). You can't believe in abstract propositions, but be a reductive physicalist about the mind. So propositions are dynamic brain structures. Easy. |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The two alternatives to volitionism in explaining action are (firstly) certain complexes of belief and desire, and (secondly) causation by an agent. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: A helpful framework. A key test case seems to that of trying to perform an action and failing (e.g. through paralysis), and this goes against the whole 'agent' being the most basic concept. One also needs room for reasons, and this supports volitionism. |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The philosophy of action is concerned with the nature of agency: what it is to be a full-blown agent, and what it is to realise one's agency in acting deliberately on things. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Being') | |
A reaction: 'Full-blown' invites the question of whether there could be a higher level of agency, beyond the capacity of human beings. Perhaps AI should design a theoretical machine that taps into those higher levels, if we can conceive of them. Meta-coherence! |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: My conclusion is that wherever you can identify causal processes that are sensitive to the recommendations of systems of justification, there you have found agency. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9b 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: [the last paragraph of his book] Justification seems an awfully grand notion for a bee pollinating a flower, and I don't see human action as profoundly different. A reason might be a bad justification, but it might not even aspire to be a justification. |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If psychological states and action results cannot be identified independently of one another, then it does not make sense to describe one as causing the other. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: This summarises a widely cited unease about the causal theory of action. Any account in action theory will need to separate out some components and explain their interrelation. Otherwise actions are primitives, and we can walk away. |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Are actions identical with bodily movements? Or are they identical with sequences of things starting inside the agent's mind with their intentions, going through their body movements and finishing with the external results being achieved? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'What is action') | |
A reaction: If bodily movements are crucial, this presumably eliminates speech acts. Speech or writing may involve some movement, but the movement is almost irrelevant to the nature of the action. Telepathy would do equally well. |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: When we do one action 'by' doing another, either the first action causes the process of the second, or the first action is part of the process of the second | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'What is by') | |
A reaction: Stout says the second view is preferable, because pressing a switch does not cause my action of turning on the light (though it does cause the light to come on). |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: I do not do an event; I do an action; so actions are not events. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Are actions') | |
A reaction: Sounds conclusive, but it places a lot of weight on the concepts of 'I' and 'do', which leaves room for some discussion. This point is opposed to the causal theory of action, because causation concerns events. |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: You do not ride a bicycle just by moving your body in a certain way. You have to be on the bicycle to move in the right sort of way | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'Are body') | |
A reaction: My favourite philosophical ideas are simple and conclusive. He also observes that walking involves the ground being walked on. In complex actions 'feedback' with the environment is involved. |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The causal theory of action asserts that what characterises intentional action is the agent's intentions, or perhaps their beliefs and desires, causing their behaviour in the appropriate way. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Outline') | |
A reaction: The agent's intentions are either sui generis (see Bratman), or reducible to beliefs and desires (as in Hume). The classic problem for the causal theory is said to be 'deviant causal chains'. |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In the vast majority of actions you need to look outwards to work out what you should do. An exam invigilator should consult the clock to design when to end the exam, not her state of mind. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The belief-') | |
A reaction: Stout defends externalist intentions. I remain unconvinced. It is no good looking at a clock if you don't form a belief about what it says, and the belief is obviously closer than the clock to the action. Intellectual virtue requires checking the facts. |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Should we try to understand what it is to have an intention in terms of what it is to act intentionally, or should we try to understand what it is to have an intention independently of what it is to act intentionally? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Acting') | |
A reaction: Since you can have an intention to act, and yet fail to act, it seems possible to isolate intentions, but not to say a lot about them. Intention may be different prior to actions, and during actions. Early Davidson offered the derived view. |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Intentions are unlike desires. You can simultaneously desire two things that you know are incompatible. But when you form intentions you are embarking on a course of action, and there is a much stronger requirement of consistency. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship') | |
A reaction: I'm not sure why anyone would identify intentions with desires. I would quite like to visit Japan, but have no current intention of doing so. I assume that the belief-plus-desire theory doesn't deny that an uninteresting intention is also needed. |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: One way to incorporate this [normative] feature of intentions would be to treat them like internal promises. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 8 'Intention') | |
A reaction: Interesting. The concept of a promise is obviously closely linked to an intention. If you tell your companion exactly where you intend your golf ball to land, you can thereby be held accountable, in a manner resembling a promise (but not a promise). |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The rationalistic approach to agency says that what characterises intentional action is that it is subject to justification. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 2 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: [Anscombe is the chief articulator of this view] This seems to incorporate action into an entirely intellectual and even moral framework. |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is plausible that we find something characteristic of intentional agency when we look inward to the mental precursors of actions, and also when we look outward, to the sensitivity of action to what the environment gives us reasons to do. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'How') | |
A reaction: This is Stout staking a claim for his partly externalist view of agency. I warm less and less to the various forms of externalism. How often does the environment 'give us reasons' to do things? How can we act, without internalising those reasons? |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The intentional action of including the word 'big' in a sentence does not require a prior intention to say it. What is required is that you say it with the intention of saying it. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship') | |
A reaction: This seems right, but makes it a lot harder to say what an intention is, and to separate it out for inspection. You can't speak a good English sentence while withdrawing the intention involved. |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Bratman has to construe what we think of as shared intentions as not literally involving shared intentions, but as involving interrelating of individual intentions. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: Stout rejects this, for an account based on adaptability of behaviour. To me, naturalism and sparse ontology favour Bratman (1984) . I like my idea that shared intentions are conditional individual intentions. If the group refuses, I drop the intention. |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: When one person says to another 'please pass the salt', and the other engages with this utterance and understands it, they share the intention that this request is passed from the first person to the second. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: Simple and intriguing. We form an intention, and then ask someone else to take over our intention. When the second person takes over the intention, I give up the intention to acquire the salt, because it is on its way. It's political. |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is unnatural to describe an individual as intending that the group do something together. ...What could possibly express my intention that we move the piano upstairs? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: Two possible answers: it makes sense if I have great authority within the group. 'I'm going to move the piano - you take that end'. Or, such expressions are implicitly conditional - 'I intend to move the piano (if you will also intend it)'. |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: An individual intention is a goal to which an individual's behaviour adapts. A shared intention is a goal to which a group of people's behaviour collectively adapts. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: This is part of Stout's externalist approach to actions. One would have thought that an intention was a state of mind, not a goal in the world. The individual's goal can be psychological, but a group's goal has to be an abstraction. |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Libet's experiments (on conscious and non-conscious choice) seem to provide empirical support for the concept of 'volition', conceived as a special kind of 'executive' mental operation. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Despite the strictures of Hobbes (Idea 2362) and Williams (Idea 2171), the will strikes me as a genuine item, clearly observable by introspection, and offering the best explanation of human behaviour. I take it to be part of the brain's frontal lobes. |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If volitionism identifies the action with an act of will, this has the unpalatable consequence (for a Cartesian dualist) that walking does not happen in the material world. It would be the same act of walking if you had no legs, or no body at all. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Volitionism') | |
A reaction: Is this attacking a caricature version of volitionism? Descartes would hardly subscribe to the view that no legs are needed for walking. If my legs spasmodically move without an act of will, we typically deny that this is an action. |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers are uneasy with understanding the causal aspect of actions in terms of an 'agent' making something happen. They prefer to think of some event in the agent, or state of the agent, making something happen. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'The causal') | |
A reaction: There is a bit of a regress if you ask what caused the event or state of affairs. It is tempting to stop the buck at the whole agent, or else carry the reduction on down to neurons, physics and the outside world. |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Once you lose the agent from an account of action it stops being an account of action at all. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'Agent') | |
A reaction: [he refers to Richard Taylor 1966] This could be correct without implying that agents offer a unique mode of causation. The concept of 'agent' is reducible. |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Weakness of will is a threat to the outward-looking approach to agency. It seems you can hold one thing to be the thing to do, and at the same time do something else. Many regard this as a decisive reason to follow a more inward-looking approach. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 8 'Weakness') | |
A reaction: It hadn't struck me before that weakness of will is a tool for developing an accurate account of what is involved in normal agency. Some facts that guide action are internal to the agent, such as greed for sugary cakes. |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Instead of assuming that your motivation depends on your emotional state, we might say that your emotional state depends on how you are motivated to act. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'Emotions') | |
A reaction: [He says this move is made by Kant, Thomas Nagel and McDowell] Stout favours the view that it is external facts which mainly give rise to actions, and presumably these facts are intrinsically motivating, prior to any emotions. I don't disagree. |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If wanting something most were the same as having the most powerful feelings about it, then as an ascetic (rejecting what you most powerfully desire), your wanting most to eat a bun would be your reason for not eating the bun. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The belief-') | |
A reaction: This sounds like reason overruling desire, but the asceticism can always be characterised as a meta-desire. |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
Full Idea: When we choose how to act in the light of our beliefs and desires, we do not feel our choices to be caused by them, but we conceive of them as giving us reasons to choose. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I agree, though this 'feeling' could be a delusion, and we certainly don't need to start talking about a 'free' will. The best account of action seems to be that the will operates on the raw material of beliefs and desires. The will is our 'decision box'. |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Beliefs, desires and intentions are states of mind rather than events, but events are the only things that figure in causal relations. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Do beliefs') | |
A reaction: This is exactly why we have the concept of 'the will' - because it is a mental state to which we attribute active causal powers. We then have to explain how this 'will' is related to the other mental states (which presume motivate or drive it?). |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The idea running through the work of Aristotle, Kant, Anscombe and Davidson is that explanation of action involves justifying that action or making it rationally intelligible. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Psychological') | |
A reaction: Stout goes on to say that instead you could give the 'rationalisation' of the action, which is psychological facts which explain the action, without justifying it. The earlier view may seem a little optimistic and intellectualist. |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is widely accepted that to get involved in the causal process of acting an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Psychological') | |
A reaction: This doesn't say whether the 'psychological states' have to be fully conscious. That seems unlikely, given the speed with which we perform some sequences of actions, such as when driving a car, or playing a musical instrument. |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: For action to be properly yours it must be you who is the causal originator of the action, rather than some state or event within you. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'Agent') | |
A reaction: [He invokes Chisholm 1966] The idea here is that we require not only 'agent causation', but that the concept of agent must include free will. It seems right we ought to know whether or not an action is 'mine'. Nothing too fancy is needed for this! |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
Full Idea: When we ask why people act in the ways that they do, we are sometimes enquiring into people's motives, at other times we want to uncover their reasons, and at others we want to know the causes of their actions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Helpful distinctions. Any one of these explanations might be collapsed into the others. Kantians, utilitarians and contractarians can study reasons, nihilists can study causes, and virtue theorists I take to be concerned with motives. |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In a relativistic notion of justification, in a particular system, there is a reason for a vandal to smash public property, even though, using an absolute conception of justification, there is no reason for him to do so. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The difference') | |
A reaction: I suppose Kantians would say that the aim of morality is to make your personal (relative) justification coincide with what seems to be the absolute justification. |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The real signficance of the doctrine of double effect can be public relations. You can put a better spin on an action by describing a death as an unfortunate collateral consequence, rather than as a goal of the action | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Doctrine') | |
A reaction: The problem is that it the principle is usually invoked in situations where it is not clear where some bad effect is intended, and it is very easy to lie in such situations. In football, we can never quite decide whether a dangerous tackle was intended. |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In the Aristotelian approach to causation (unlike the Humean approach, involving separate events), A might cause B by being an input into some process (realisation of potentiality) that results in B. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'Trying') | |
A reaction: Stout relies quite heavily on this view for his account of human action. I like processes, so am sympathetic to this view. If there are two separate events, it is not surprising that Hume could find nothing to bridge the gap between them. |