77 ideas
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The traditional conception of Reason is that all beliefs should be justified (that is, backed up by reasons) in order to be rational. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6) | |
A reaction: I think it is the duty of all philosophers to either defend this traditional view, or quit philosophy for some other activity. Rorty suggests hermeneutics. In a democracy, rulers should be continually required to give reasons for their decisions. |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Valid deductive arguments have the property of monotonicity; if the conclusion Q follows from the premises P, then it will also follow if further premises P* are added to P. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1) | |
A reaction: For perversity's sake we could add a new premise which contradicted one of the original ones ('Socrates is a god'). Or one premise could be 'I believe..', and the new one could show that the belief was false. Induction is non-monotonic. |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The move from what can (or cannot) be known to exist to what does (or does not) exist has been dubbed the 'epistemic fallacy'. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6) | |
A reaction: This should be a standard concept in all philosophical discussion. It is the commonest, simplest, and most profound blunder made by philosophers, and they do it all the time. |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There can be explanations without predictions, as when we explain a previous position of Mars from its present one, plus a law. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.9) | |
A reaction: If we don't mind stretching the word, I think we can 'predict' the past, as where I predict the location of an Egyptian tomb from my study of papyruses. |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There can be predictions without explanations, as when a barometer successfully predicts storms, but on its own it does not explain them. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.8) | |
A reaction: Actually, barometers contribute to explanations. A reasonable predictor might offer no explanation ('if he's out, she's probably out too'), but an infallible predictor is almost certain to involve causation, which helps a lot in explanation. |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Unlike deductive arguments, induction is non-monotonic - that is, it can be invalidated by the addition of new premises. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a fancy way of stating the obvious, which is that induction is not a type of deduction. Hume is sometimes accused of this false assumption. Presumably induction is rational, even if it is not actually logical. |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The three types of explanation are 'epistemic' (the event is expectable because of a law), or 'modal' (the event is necessary because of a law), or 'ontic' (it is shown how the event fits into the world's causal structure). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §11.1) | |
A reaction: Prediction, necessity or causes. It is hard to think of any other way to explain something. Presumably you would exclude necessities if you didn't believe in them. Hume would go for prediction, on the basis of regularities. Personally, I want it all. |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In evolutionary explanations you may explain a population trait in terms of what it is for the sake of an individual, or explain it in terms of what it was for the sake of in earlier generations, but never in terms of what the trait is for the sake of. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 2 'Functions') | |
A reaction: So my ears are for the sake of my ability to hear, but that does not explain why I have ears. Should we say there is 'impersonal teleology' here, but no 'personal teleology'? Interesting. |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Explanation has to do with understanding; just citing a cause would not offer an adequate understanding, unless it was accompanied by the citation of a law that connects the two events. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: It is surely undeniable that being told the cause but not the law will increase our understanding. Understanding and explanation come in degrees. Full understanding would require an explanation of the law, and beyond. Any relevant truth helps. |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The 'deductive-nomological' model became known as the 'covering law model': its main thesis is that laws and only laws adequately explain the occurrence of singular events. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: But presumably you need other events to derive a law, so you could say that a singular event can only be explained if it isn't singular. A regularity pattern would offer a partial explanation, before any law had been derived. |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If we use geometry and optics to explain the length of shadow cast by a flag-pole, this seems to be reversible, so that the shadow will explain the length of the pole. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.5) | |
A reaction: A neat example which presumably implies that an explanation must involve temporal statements. The laws of physics are totally reversible in time, and so will not suffice to explain events on their own. Time's arrow becomes an axiom of explanation? |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: A crucial basic point, which must be drummed into the minds of ruthless Quinean naturalists, who want to explain everything by quarks and electrons |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Knocking over an ink bottle explains the stain on the carpet, and it is not in doubt because you cannot quote the laws involved; a 'causal story' can give a complete explanation without a law. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.6) | |
A reaction: But why is he so clumsy, and the bottle so unstable? Was it really (Freudian) an 'accident'? There is no end to complete explanation. But 'I was clumsy this once' and 'I am always clumsy' are equally good explanations. |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Not all explanation is causal. Explaining the beauty of a painting is not explaining why something happened. or why a move in chess is illegal, or why the square root of two is not a rational number. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Argument') | |
A reaction: It is surely plausible that the illegality of the chess move is caused (or 'determined', as I prefer to say) by the laws created for chess. The painting example seems right, though; what determined its configuration (think Pollock!) does not explain it. |
17472 | Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: In chemistry the 'thick' notion of a mechanism traces out positions of electrons and atomic cores, and correlates them with energies, showing the whole reaction. 'Thin' mechanisms focus on a discrete set of intermediate steps. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1) |
17471 | Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: The production of mechanisms as explanatory schemes finds its original home in chemistry. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to mechanisms in biology or neuroscience, which come later. |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers focus on the so-called 'pragmatics of explanation' - that an explanation is an answer to a 'why' question, and the relevant answer will depend on the presuppositions or interests of the questioner. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me right. Explanation is an entirely human business, not a feature of nature, and most explanations will track back to the big bang if you have the patience, but they always terminate because of pragmatic considerations. But fobbing off? |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
Full Idea: An explanation amounts to the removal of the initial surprise that accompanied the occurrence of the event. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: This is a nice simple point. It makes explanation relative. God requires no explanations, small children require many. The implication is that explanations make events predictable, which means they must either offer inductive generalisations, or laws. |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There is a problem if causation is the object of our analysis, but is also presupposed (as an empirical principle of human psychology) for the functioning of the mind. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like a major problem. If it is, it is presumably impossible to analyse the mind, because a mind is presupposed in the process of analysis. |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The philosophy of action is concerned with the nature of agency: what it is to be a full-blown agent, and what it is to realise one's agency in acting deliberately on things. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Being') | |
A reaction: 'Full-blown' invites the question of whether there could be a higher level of agency, beyond the capacity of human beings. Perhaps AI should design a theoretical machine that taps into those higher levels, if we can conceive of them. Meta-coherence! |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: My conclusion is that wherever you can identify causal processes that are sensitive to the recommendations of systems of justification, there you have found agency. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9b 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: [the last paragraph of his book] Justification seems an awfully grand notion for a bee pollinating a flower, and I don't see human action as profoundly different. A reason might be a bad justification, but it might not even aspire to be a justification. |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If psychological states and action results cannot be identified independently of one another, then it does not make sense to describe one as causing the other. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: This summarises a widely cited unease about the causal theory of action. Any account in action theory will need to separate out some components and explain their interrelation. Otherwise actions are primitives, and we can walk away. |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Are actions identical with bodily movements? Or are they identical with sequences of things starting inside the agent's mind with their intentions, going through their body movements and finishing with the external results being achieved? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'What is action') | |
A reaction: If bodily movements are crucial, this presumably eliminates speech acts. Speech or writing may involve some movement, but the movement is almost irrelevant to the nature of the action. Telepathy would do equally well. |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: When we do one action 'by' doing another, either the first action causes the process of the second, or the first action is part of the process of the second | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'What is by') | |
A reaction: Stout says the second view is preferable, because pressing a switch does not cause my action of turning on the light (though it does cause the light to come on). |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: I do not do an event; I do an action; so actions are not events. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Are actions') | |
A reaction: Sounds conclusive, but it places a lot of weight on the concepts of 'I' and 'do', which leaves room for some discussion. This point is opposed to the causal theory of action, because causation concerns events. |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: You do not ride a bicycle just by moving your body in a certain way. You have to be on the bicycle to move in the right sort of way | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'Are body') | |
A reaction: My favourite philosophical ideas are simple and conclusive. He also observes that walking involves the ground being walked on. In complex actions 'feedback' with the environment is involved. |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The rationalistic approach to agency says that what characterises intentional action is that it is subject to justification. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 2 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: [Anscombe is the chief articulator of this view] This seems to incorporate action into an entirely intellectual and even moral framework. |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The causal theory of action asserts that what characterises intentional action is the agent's intentions, or perhaps their beliefs and desires, causing their behaviour in the appropriate way. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Outline') | |
A reaction: The agent's intentions are either sui generis (see Bratman), or reducible to beliefs and desires (as in Hume). The classic problem for the causal theory is said to be 'deviant causal chains'. |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In the vast majority of actions you need to look outwards to work out what you should do. An exam invigilator should consult the clock to design when to end the exam, not her state of mind. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The belief-') | |
A reaction: Stout defends externalist intentions. I remain unconvinced. It is no good looking at a clock if you don't form a belief about what it says, and the belief is obviously closer than the clock to the action. Intellectual virtue requires checking the facts. |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Should we try to understand what it is to have an intention in terms of what it is to act intentionally, or should we try to understand what it is to have an intention independently of what it is to act intentionally? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Acting') | |
A reaction: Since you can have an intention to act, and yet fail to act, it seems possible to isolate intentions, but not to say a lot about them. Intention may be different prior to actions, and during actions. Early Davidson offered the derived view. |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Intentions are unlike desires. You can simultaneously desire two things that you know are incompatible. But when you form intentions you are embarking on a course of action, and there is a much stronger requirement of consistency. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship') | |
A reaction: I'm not sure why anyone would identify intentions with desires. I would quite like to visit Japan, but have no current intention of doing so. I assume that the belief-plus-desire theory doesn't deny that an uninteresting intention is also needed. |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: One way to incorporate this [normative] feature of intentions would be to treat them like internal promises. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 8 'Intention') | |
A reaction: Interesting. The concept of a promise is obviously closely linked to an intention. If you tell your companion exactly where you intend your golf ball to land, you can thereby be held accountable, in a manner resembling a promise (but not a promise). |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is plausible that we find something characteristic of intentional agency when we look inward to the mental precursors of actions, and also when we look outward, to the sensitivity of action to what the environment gives us reasons to do. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'How') | |
A reaction: This is Stout staking a claim for his partly externalist view of agency. I warm less and less to the various forms of externalism. How often does the environment 'give us reasons' to do things? How can we act, without internalising those reasons? |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The intentional action of including the word 'big' in a sentence does not require a prior intention to say it. What is required is that you say it with the intention of saying it. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship') | |
A reaction: This seems right, but makes it a lot harder to say what an intention is, and to separate it out for inspection. You can't speak a good English sentence while withdrawing the intention involved. |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Bratman has to construe what we think of as shared intentions as not literally involving shared intentions, but as involving interrelating of individual intentions. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: Stout rejects this, for an account based on adaptability of behaviour. To me, naturalism and sparse ontology favour Bratman (1984) . I like my idea that shared intentions are conditional individual intentions. If the group refuses, I drop the intention. |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: When one person says to another 'please pass the salt', and the other engages with this utterance and understands it, they share the intention that this request is passed from the first person to the second. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: Simple and intriguing. We form an intention, and then ask someone else to take over our intention. When the second person takes over the intention, I give up the intention to acquire the salt, because it is on its way. It's political. |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is unnatural to describe an individual as intending that the group do something together. ...What could possibly express my intention that we move the piano upstairs? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: Two possible answers: it makes sense if I have great authority within the group. 'I'm going to move the piano - you take that end'. Or, such expressions are implicitly conditional - 'I intend to move the piano (if you will also intend it)'. |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: An individual intention is a goal to which an individual's behaviour adapts. A shared intention is a goal to which a group of people's behaviour collectively adapts. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: This is part of Stout's externalist approach to actions. One would have thought that an intention was a state of mind, not a goal in the world. The individual's goal can be psychological, but a group's goal has to be an abstraction. |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If volitionism identifies the action with an act of will, this has the unpalatable consequence (for a Cartesian dualist) that walking does not happen in the material world. It would be the same act of walking if you had no legs, or no body at all. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Volitionism') | |
A reaction: Is this attacking a caricature version of volitionism? Descartes would hardly subscribe to the view that no legs are needed for walking. If my legs spasmodically move without an act of will, we typically deny that this is an action. |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers are uneasy with understanding the causal aspect of actions in terms of an 'agent' making something happen. They prefer to think of some event in the agent, or state of the agent, making something happen. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'The causal') | |
A reaction: There is a bit of a regress if you ask what caused the event or state of affairs. It is tempting to stop the buck at the whole agent, or else carry the reduction on down to neurons, physics and the outside world. |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Once you lose the agent from an account of action it stops being an account of action at all. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'Agent') | |
A reaction: [he refers to Richard Taylor 1966] This could be correct without implying that agents offer a unique mode of causation. The concept of 'agent' is reducible. |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Weakness of will is a threat to the outward-looking approach to agency. It seems you can hold one thing to be the thing to do, and at the same time do something else. Many regard this as a decisive reason to follow a more inward-looking approach. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 8 'Weakness') | |
A reaction: It hadn't struck me before that weakness of will is a tool for developing an accurate account of what is involved in normal agency. Some facts that guide action are internal to the agent, such as greed for sugary cakes. |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Instead of assuming that your motivation depends on your emotional state, we might say that your emotional state depends on how you are motivated to act. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'Emotions') | |
A reaction: [He says this move is made by Kant, Thomas Nagel and McDowell] Stout favours the view that it is external facts which mainly give rise to actions, and presumably these facts are intrinsically motivating, prior to any emotions. I don't disagree. |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If wanting something most were the same as having the most powerful feelings about it, then as an ascetic (rejecting what you most powerfully desire), your wanting most to eat a bun would be your reason for not eating the bun. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The belief-') | |
A reaction: This sounds like reason overruling desire, but the asceticism can always be characterised as a meta-desire. |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Beliefs, desires and intentions are states of mind rather than events, but events are the only things that figure in causal relations. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Do beliefs') | |
A reaction: This is exactly why we have the concept of 'the will' - because it is a mental state to which we attribute active causal powers. We then have to explain how this 'will' is related to the other mental states (which presume motivate or drive it?). |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The idea running through the work of Aristotle, Kant, Anscombe and Davidson is that explanation of action involves justifying that action or making it rationally intelligible. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Psychological') | |
A reaction: Stout goes on to say that instead you could give the 'rationalisation' of the action, which is psychological facts which explain the action, without justifying it. The earlier view may seem a little optimistic and intellectualist. |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is widely accepted that to get involved in the causal process of acting an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Psychological') | |
A reaction: This doesn't say whether the 'psychological states' have to be fully conscious. That seems unlikely, given the speed with which we perform some sequences of actions, such as when driving a car, or playing a musical instrument. |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: For action to be properly yours it must be you who is the causal originator of the action, rather than some state or event within you. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'Agent') | |
A reaction: [He invokes Chisholm 1966] The idea here is that we require not only 'agent causation', but that the concept of agent must include free will. It seems right we ought to know whether or not an action is 'mine'. Nothing too fancy is needed for this! |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In a relativistic notion of justification, in a particular system, there is a reason for a vandal to smash public property, even though, using an absolute conception of justification, there is no reason for him to do so. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The difference') | |
A reaction: I suppose Kantians would say that the aim of morality is to make your personal (relative) justification coincide with what seems to be the absolute justification. |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The real signficance of the doctrine of double effect can be public relations. You can put a better spin on an action by describing a death as an unfortunate collateral consequence, rather than as a goal of the action | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Doctrine') | |
A reaction: The problem is that it the principle is usually invoked in situations where it is not clear where some bad effect is intended, and it is very easy to lie in such situations. In football, we can never quite decide whether a dangerous tackle was intended. |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.8) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Hume's is/ought claim - what he calls the mind 'spreading itself'. It is a powerful claim. Personally I think we have become TOO sceptical here, and have the delusion that crucial features of nature are created within our minds. |
17465 | Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Four types of earth found a place on Lavoisier's list of elements. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.2) | |
A reaction: A nice intermediate point between the ancient Greek and the modern view of earth. |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The platitudes of causation are that 1) causes make a difference (counterfactually or probabilistically), 2) causes are recipes for events, 3) causes explain their effects, and 4) causes are evidence for effects. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: A nice piece of analysis which offers some problems for anyone (like Russell) who wants to analyse causation completely out of our conceptual scheme. |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
Full Idea: While Humeans base their theories on the intuition of regularity, their opponents base theirs on the intuition that there is an intrinsic relation between the properties of two particular things involved (like a hammer and a vase). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I favour the intrinsic relation of properties view, but this leaves the question of whether we can explain a relation, apart from observing the regularities associated with the properties. |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
Full Idea: We cannot distinguish between good and bad explanations of some phenomena, unless we first distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but it pushes us towards the idea that causation is non-analysable, and must be taken as a metaphysically basic axiom. If naturalistic accounts fail, that may be only alternative. |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The three ways to divide theories on causation are: between generalist and singularist, between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations of the causal relationship, and between reductive and non-reductive approaches. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5) | |
A reaction: Okay. I vote for singularist, intrinsic and reductive. I'm guessing that that pushes me towards Salmon and Dowe's theory of the 'transfer of conserved quantities', which is certainly reductive, doesn't need regularities in the events, and seems intrinsic. |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If causation is taken to be an 'intrinsic' relation, then that c causes e will have to depend entirely on the properties of c and e, and the relations between c and e. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.2) | |
A reaction: This view would move us towards 'essentialism', that the essences of objects produce the events and the laws, rather than external imposed forces and laws. |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In the Aristotelian approach to causation (unlike the Humean approach, involving separate events), A might cause B by being an input into some process (realisation of potentiality) that results in B. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'Trying') | |
A reaction: Stout relies quite heavily on this view for his account of human action. I like processes, so am sympathetic to this view. If there are two separate events, it is not surprising that Hume could find nothing to bridge the gap between them. |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The logical empiricists (esp. Hempel) analysed the concept of causation in terms of causal explanation, and analysed the latter as a species of deductive argument, with one premises stating a universal law (the so-called Deductive-Nomological model). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This feels wrong, as deduction seems insufficiently naturalistic, and the assumption of a law as premise seems to beg heaps of questions. |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If counterfactual claims can be made about causation, this suggests that there is more to it than mere regular succession. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §2.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Even Hume makes counterfactual claims in his first definition of cause, and all claims of causation seem to go beyond the immediate evidence. |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The statement "all gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" seems to have all the features demanded of a lawlike statement, yet it can hardly be said to express a law. It is a merely true universal generalisation. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.3) | |
A reaction: Nice example. A trickier case is "all cubes of uranium are smaller than one cubic mile", which sounds like part of a law. It suggests a blurred borderline between the two. How much gold is there in the universe? Is that fact a natural necessity? |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
Full Idea: A rather important objection to Humeanism has been that regularity is not sufficient for causation. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Obviously a crucial problem, but the Humean view can defend itself by introducing other constant conjunctions. We don't observe events in isolation, but as part of a pattern of regularities. |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The Humean view depends on the conjunction of two general theses: first, causation is tied to regularity; secondly, causal facts supervene on non-causal facts. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4) | |
A reaction: If causation is just regularities, this means it is patterns observed by us, which means causation doesn't actually exist. So Hume is wrong. Singular causation is possible, and needs explanation. |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
Full Idea: A regularity can be used to predict a future event irrespective of whether it is deemed causal or not. A farmer can predict that dawn has broken on hearing the cock's crow. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.1) | |
A reaction: This seems a highly significant criticism of any view that says regularity leads to causation, which is the basis of induction, which leads to counterfactual claims, and thus arrives a the laws of nature. |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
Full Idea: It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Good example, but it doesn't demolish the regularity view. We should come to conscious minds last. There aren't many other unfailing regularities that are not laws. |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
Full Idea: In the 'web-of-laws' approach, laws are those regularities that are members of a coherent system of regularities, in particular, a system that can be represented as a deductive axiomatic system, striking a good balance between simplicity and strength. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.6) | |
A reaction: Psillos attribute this view to Mill, Ramsey and Lewis. It is the obvious candidate for a fully developed Humean empiricist system, where regularities reinforce one another. I think laws are found in mechanisms, not in regularities, which are symptoms. |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers will find dispositional essentialism unappealing, not least because it seems to fail to explain how (and in virtue of what) there is this supposed fundamental distinction between essential and non-essential properties. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002]) | |
A reaction: Maybe there is no precise definition, but any idiot can see that some properties of gold are essential (mass) and others non-essential (attractive to jackdaws). It's a fair question, but is this the strongest objection to essentialism? |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
Full Idea: In "had the acrobat jumped, there would have been a safety net" the antecedent of the counterfactual (the jumping) is temporally later than the consequent (the installation of the net). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §3.3) | |
A reaction: This blocks anyone (e.g. David Lewis) who tries to define counterfactual claims entirely in terms of a condition followed by a consequence. Nice example. |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual theory is a non-Humean relation between singular events; the thought is that causation makes a difference - to say that c causes e is to say that if c hadn't occurred, e wouldn't have occurred either. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4) | |
A reaction: Helpful. I'm beginning to think that this theory is wrong. It gives an account of how we see causation, and a test for it, but it says nothing about what causation actually is. |
17468 | Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: There are well over 100,000,000 chemical compounds that have been discovered or synthesised, all of which have been formally characterised. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.3) |
17470 | Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Water's structure cannot simply be described as a collection of individual molecules. There is a continual dissociation of H2O molecules into hydrogen and hydroxide ions; they former larger polymeric species, explaining conductivity, melting and boiling. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] If philosophers try to state the 'essence of water', they had better not be too glib about it. |
17473 | It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers believe chemistry has not been reduced to physics nor is it likely to be. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: [Le Poidevin 2007 argues the opposite] That chemical features are actually metaphysically 'emergent' is a rare view, defended by Hendry. The general view is that the concepts are too different, and approximations render it hopeless. |
17474 | Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Quantum mechanics cannot tell us why a given collection of atoms will adopt one molecular structure (and set of chemical properties) or the other. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably it the 'chance' process of how the atoms are thrown together. |
17475 | For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: Having a particular average kinetic energy is only a necessary condition for having a given temperature, not a sufficient one, because only gases at equilibrium have a well-defined temperature. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 6.2) | |
A reaction: If you try to pin it all down more precisely, the definition turns out to be circular. |
17469 | 'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: 'H2O' is not a description of any microstructure. It is a compositional formula, describing the combining proportions of hydrogen and oxygen to make water. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 4.5) |
17467 | Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: There are chemically salient differences among the isotopes, best illustrated by the three isotopes of hydrogen: protium, deuterium and tritium, which show different rates of reaction, making heavy water poisonous where ordinary water is not. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [They cite Paul Needham 2008] The point is that the isotopes are the natural kinds, rather than the traditional elements. The view is unorthodox, but clearly makes a good point. |
17466 | Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
Full Idea: In addition to providing the systematization of the elements used in modern chemistry, Mendeleev also gave an account of the nature of the elements which informs contemporary philosophical understanding. | |
From: Weisberg/Needham/Hendry (Philosophy of Chemistry [2011], 1.3) |