8 ideas
6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
Full Idea: Rationality doesn't require consistency, because you can be rational despite undetected inconsistencies in beliefs, and it isn't always rational to respond to a discovery of inconsistency by dropping everything in favour of eliminating that inconsistency. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being correct, and is (I am beginning to realise) a vital contribution made to our understanding by pragmatism. European thinking has been too keen on logic as the model of good reasoning. |
6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
Full Idea: A set of unrelated beliefs seems less coherent than a tightly organized conceptual scheme that contains explanatory principles that make sense of most of your beliefs; this is why inference to the best explanation is an attractive pattern of inference. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.5.2) | |
A reaction: I find this a very appealing proposal. The central aim of rational thought seems to me to be best explanation, and I increasingly think that most of my beliefs rest on their apparent coherence, rather than their foundations. |
10494 | Several words may label a category; one word can name several categories; some categories lack words [Ellen] |
Full Idea: Words are not always a good guide to the existence of categories: there may be several words which label the same categories (synonyms). and the same word can be used for quite different ideas. Some categories may exist without being labelled. | |
From: Roy Ellen (Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology [2006], I) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of point which seems obvious to anyone outside philosophy, but which philosophers seem to find difficult to accept. Philosophers should pay much more attention to animals, and to illiterate peoples. Varieties of rice can lack labels. |
6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
Full Idea: We might think of enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation, taking the generalization to explain its instances. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.5.2) | |
A reaction: This is a helpful connection. The best explanation of these swans being white is that all swans are white; it ceased to be the best explanation when black swans turned up. In the ultimate case, a law of nature is the explanation. |
6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that inductive reasoning is 'defeasible', meaning that considerations that support a given conclusion can be defeated by additional information. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.4.5) | |
A reaction: True. The point is that being defeasible does not prevent such thinking from being rational. The rational part of it is to acknowledge that your conclusion is defeasible. |
6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
Full Idea: Deductive logic is concerned with deductive implication, not deductive reasoning; all reasoning is inductive | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.4.5) | |
A reaction: This may be an attempt to stipulate how the word 'reasoning' should be used in future. It is, though, a bold and interesting claim, given the reputation of induction (since Hume) of being a totally irrational process. |
6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
Full Idea: Ordinary rationality is generally conservative, in the sense that you start from where you are, with your present beliefs and intentions. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.3) | |
A reaction: This stands opposed to the Cartesian or philosophers' rationality, which requires that (where possible) everything be proved from scratch. Harman seems right, that the normal onus of proof is on changing beliefs, rather proving you should retain them. |
21131 | Democracy is competition for support of the people, guided by self-interest on all sides [Posner] |
Full Idea: Democratic politics is a competition among self-interested politicians, constituting a ruling class, for the support of the people, also assumed to be self-interested, and none too interested or well informed about politics. | |
From: Richard Posner (Law, Pragmatism and Democracy [2003], p.144), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 05 | |
A reaction: This articulates the 'competitive' view of democracy, as simply a technique for establishing legitimacy. Posner is also an economist, and they also assume that everyone is wholly self-interested, which may be why they are so frequently wrong. |