Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology', 'Fifteen Sermons' and 'The Will to Believe'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Several words may label a category; one word can name several categories; some categories lack words [Ellen]
     Full Idea: Words are not always a good guide to the existence of categories: there may be several words which label the same categories (synonyms). and the same word can be used for quite different ideas. Some categories may exist without being labelled.
     From: Roy Ellen (Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology [2006], I)
     A reaction: This is the sort of point which seems obvious to anyone outside philosophy, but which philosophers seem to find difficult to accept. Philosophers should pay much more attention to animals, and to illiterate peoples. Varieties of rice can lack labels.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler]
     Full Idea: Butler exalts conscience, but appears ignorant that a man's conscience may tell him to do the vilest things.
     From: comment on Joseph Butler (Fifteen Sermons [1726]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176
     A reaction: That would appear to be the end of conscience. To make conscience work, it must have a huge authority to back it, and also a fairly infallible means of knowing what it truly says, and that an impostor hasn't replaced it (e.g. via a bad upbringing).
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James]
     Full Idea: Consider a case in which millions could be made permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture.
     From: William James (The Will to Believe [1896], p.188), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2
     A reaction: This seems to be one of the earliest pinpointings of a key problem with utilitiarianism, which is that other values than happiness (in this case, fairness) seem to be utterly overruled. If we ignore fairness, why shouldn't we ignore happiness?