Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology', 'Fear and Trembling' and 'Finkish dispositions'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Several words may label a category; one word can name several categories; some categories lack words [Ellen]
     Full Idea: Words are not always a good guide to the existence of categories: there may be several words which label the same categories (synonyms). and the same word can be used for quite different ideas. Some categories may exist without being labelled.
     From: Roy Ellen (Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology [2006], I)
     A reaction: This is the sort of point which seems obvious to anyone outside philosophy, but which philosophers seem to find difficult to accept. Philosophers should pay much more attention to animals, and to illiterate peoples. Varieties of rice can lack labels.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
     Full Idea: To avoid the danger of claiming that dispositions are their own categorical bases, we do better to eschew the alleged distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties altogether.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II)
     A reaction: Since I have been unable to form any intuitive notion of what a 'categorical' property is, I like this, though not necessarily for his reason.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Prior, Pargetter and Jackson have argued convincingly for the thesis that all dispositions must have causal bases.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II)
     A reaction: [Their paper is 1982] This key thesis is tackled by modern defenders of powers. The question is not who has the best arguments, but who offers the most coherent picture. What is a 'causal basis'? What sort of thing could be primitive or fundamental?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A disposition which would straight away vanish if put to the test is called 'finkish'. A finkishly fragile thing is fragile so long as it is not struck. But if it were struck, it would straight away cease to be fragile, and it would not break.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I)
     A reaction: There are also 'antidotes'. Finks kill the disposition, antidotes kill the effect. These cases are problems for the simple conditional analysis of a disposition - because we never achieved the consequent.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
     Full Idea: 'Backtracking' counterfactual reasoning runs from a counterfactually supposed event to the causal antecedents it would have to have had.
     From: David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], I)
     A reaction: Why not call it a 'transcendental' counterfactual? Presumably you go thisworld>> counterfactualevent>> worldneededtocauseit. It conjures up two possible worlds instead of one.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: Either Abraham was a murderer, or we confront a paradox higher than all mediation. His story therefore contains the teleological suspension of the ethical, and he becomes higher than the universal. If not, he is not a tragic hero or the father of faith.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Fear and Trembling [1843], p.49)
     A reaction: A nice dilemma for Christian thinkers who want to reconcile reason and morality with religion. [SY]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: The story of Abraham (and Isaac) contains a teleological suspension of the ethical. ...In his action he overstepped the ethical altogether, and had a higher idea outside it, in relation to which he suspended it.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Fear and Trembling [1843], Prob I)
     A reaction: My immediate response is to find this proposal very sinister. I can't remotely understand what Abraham's (or God's) 'higher' idea could be that could justify this crime. Maybe ethics is suspended if you are on the beach and a tidal wave arrives?