Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logical Syntax of Language', 'Schopenhauer' and 'Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

21373	We become objective when we detach ourselves from the world [Janaway]
	Full Idea: We apprehend the world purely objectively, only when we no longer know that we belong to it.
	From: Christopher Janaway (Schopenhauer [1994], II:368), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Objectivity'
	A reaction: Since we are not actually detached from the world, that makes objective thought an act of imagination. And none the worse for that, I would say, since philosophers don't seem to understand the central epistemological importance of imagination.

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence

13342	Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
	Full Idea: Carnap proposed to define consequence as 'sentence X follows from the sentences K iff the sentences K and the negation of X are contradictory', but 1) this is intuitively impossible, and 2) consequence would be changed by substituting objects.
	From: comment on Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], p.88-) by Alfred Tarski - The Concept of Logical Consequence p.414
	A reaction: This seems to be the first step in the ongoing explicit discussion of the nature of logical consequence, which is now seen by many as the central concept of logic. Tarski brings his new tool of 'satisfaction' to bear.

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention

13251	Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
	Full Idea: In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language. All that is required is that he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
	From: Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], §17), quoted by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Pluralism 7.3
	A reaction: This is understandable, but strikes me as close to daft relativism. If I specify a silly logic, I presume its silliness will be obvious. By what criteria? I say the world dictates the true logic, but this is a minority view.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation

22591	We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch]
	Full Idea: We know of perfection as we look upon what is imperfect.
	From: Iris Murdoch (Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals [1992], 13)
	A reaction: This is in the context of a discussion of the ontological argument for God's existence, but I seize on it as a nice expression of the idealisation capacity of our minds. The alternative is that perfection is innate idea, since we aren't seeing it.