7 ideas
| 21373 | We become objective when we detach ourselves from the world [Janaway] |
| Full Idea: We apprehend the world purely objectively, only when we no longer know that we belong to it. | |
| From: Christopher Janaway (Schopenhauer [1994], II:368), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Objectivity' | |
| A reaction: Since we are not actually detached from the world, that makes objective thought an act of imagination. And none the worse for that, I would say, since philosophers don't seem to understand the central epistemological importance of imagination. |
| 13342 | Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap] |
| Full Idea: Carnap proposed to define consequence as 'sentence X follows from the sentences K iff the sentences K and the negation of X are contradictory', but 1) this is intuitively impossible, and 2) consequence would be changed by substituting objects. | |
| From: comment on Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], p.88-) by Alfred Tarski - The Concept of Logical Consequence p.414 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the first step in the ongoing explicit discussion of the nature of logical consequence, which is now seen by many as the central concept of logic. Tarski brings his new tool of 'satisfaction' to bear. |
| 13251 | Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap] |
| Full Idea: In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language. All that is required is that he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. | |
| From: Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], §17), quoted by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Pluralism 7.3 | |
| A reaction: This is understandable, but strikes me as close to daft relativism. If I specify a silly logic, I presume its silliness will be obvious. By what criteria? I say the world dictates the true logic, but this is a minority view. |
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| Full Idea: No two classes have exactly the same members, but two different attributes may be attributes of exactly the same things. Classes are identical when their members are identical. ...On the other hand, attributes have no clear principle of individuation. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.100) |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| Full Idea: May we not say that you know an attribute only insofar as you know what things have it? | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.106) | |
| A reaction: Simple, and the best defence of class nominalism (a very implausible theory) which I have encountered. Do I have to know all the things? Do I not know 'red' if I don't know tomatoes have it? |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| Full Idea: We have an acceptable notion of class, or physical object, or attribute, or any other sort of object, only insofar as we have an acceptable principle of individuation for that sort of object. There is no entity without identity. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.102) | |
| A reaction: Note that this is his criterion for an 'acceptable' notion. Presumably that is for science. It permits less acceptable notions which don't come up to the standard. And presumably true things can be said about the less acceptable entities. |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Physical objects are identical if and only if coextensive. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.101) | |
| A reaction: The supposed counterexample to this is the statue and the clay it is made of, which are said to have different modal properties (destroying the statue doesn't destroy the clay). |