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13750
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Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
Urmson explains the direction of analysis as 'towards a structure...more nearly similar to the structure of the fact', adding that this metaphysical picture is needed as a 'rationale of the practice of analysis'.
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From:
report of J.O. Urmson (Philosophical Analysis [1956], p.24-5) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What n30
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A reaction:
In other words, only realists can be truly motivated to keep going with analysis. Merely analysing language-games is doable, but hardly exciting.
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13342
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Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
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Full Idea:
Carnap proposed to define consequence as 'sentence X follows from the sentences K iff the sentences K and the negation of X are contradictory', but 1) this is intuitively impossible, and 2) consequence would be changed by substituting objects.
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From:
comment on Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], p.88-) by Alfred Tarski - The Concept of Logical Consequence p.414
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A reaction:
This seems to be the first step in the ongoing explicit discussion of the nature of logical consequence, which is now seen by many as the central concept of logic. Tarski brings his new tool of 'satisfaction' to bear.
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13251
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Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language. All that is required is that he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], §17), quoted by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Pluralism 7.3
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A reaction:
This is understandable, but strikes me as close to daft relativism. If I specify a silly logic, I presume its silliness will be obvious. By what criteria? I say the world dictates the true logic, but this is a minority view.
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21053
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The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant]
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Full Idea:
Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], Intro)
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A reaction:
So free will either requires total substance dualism, or it is best described as transcendental fictionalism. This seems to imply the Leibnizian idea that metaphysics contains facts which having nothing to do with the physical world.
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