Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logical Syntax of Language', 'works' and 'The Structure of Content'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
     Full Idea: Carnap proposed to define consequence as 'sentence X follows from the sentences K iff the sentences K and the negation of X are contradictory', but 1) this is intuitively impossible, and 2) consequence would be changed by substituting objects.
     From: comment on Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], p.88-) by Alfred Tarski - The Concept of Logical Consequence p.414
     A reaction: This seems to be the first step in the ongoing explicit discussion of the nature of logical consequence, which is now seen by many as the central concept of logic. Tarski brings his new tool of 'satisfaction' to bear.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
     Full Idea: In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language. All that is required is that he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
     From: Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], §17), quoted by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Pluralism 7.3
     A reaction: This is understandable, but strikes me as close to daft relativism. If I specify a silly logic, I presume its silliness will be obvious. By what criteria? I say the world dictates the true logic, but this is a minority view.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn]
     Full Idea: We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions.
     From: Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6
     A reaction: McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein]
     Full Idea: Dewey argued in the twenties that there could not be, in any serious sense, a private language. Wittgenstein also, years later, came to appreciate this point.
     From: report of John Dewey (works [1926]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6
     A reaction: A nice historical footnote to perhaps the most famous argument in twentieth century philosophy. Can anyone send me the Dewey reference?