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All the ideas for 'The Logical Syntax of Language', 'works' and 'Summula philosophiae naturalis'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
     Full Idea: Carnap proposed to define consequence as 'sentence X follows from the sentences K iff the sentences K and the negation of X are contradictory', but 1) this is intuitively impossible, and 2) consequence would be changed by substituting objects.
     From: comment on Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], p.88-) by Alfred Tarski - The Concept of Logical Consequence p.414
     A reaction: This seems to be the first step in the ongoing explicit discussion of the nature of logical consequence, which is now seen by many as the central concept of logic. Tarski brings his new tool of 'satisfaction' to bear.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
     Full Idea: In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own logic, i.e. his own form of language. All that is required is that he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
     From: Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Syntax of Language [1934], §17), quoted by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Pluralism 7.3
     A reaction: This is understandable, but strikes me as close to daft relativism. If I specify a silly logic, I presume its silliness will be obvious. By what criteria? I say the world dictates the true logic, but this is a minority view.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Ockham is the scholastic paradigm of anti-realism with respect to the categories.
     From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 05.3
     A reaction: These are the ten categories mentioned in Aristotle's book 'Categories'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Ockham regards Quantity as an entirely superfluous ontological category, …because matter is intrinsically extended.
     From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.4
Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Matter is made to have a greater or lesser quantity not through its receiving any absolute accident, but through condensation and rarefaction alone. Parts come more or less close together, which can happen with local motion.
     From: William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320], I.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.1
     A reaction: This is Ockham at his most modern, rejecting the odd idea of Quantity in favour of a modern corpuscular view of the mere motions of matter.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein]
     Full Idea: Dewey argued in the twenties that there could not be, in any serious sense, a private language. Wittgenstein also, years later, came to appreciate this point.
     From: report of John Dewey (works [1926]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6
     A reaction: A nice historical footnote to perhaps the most famous argument in twentieth century philosophy. Can anyone send me the Dewey reference?