|
9212
|
Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
|
|
A reaction:
The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.
|
|
9213
|
The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
|
|
A reaction:
His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.
|
|
7091
|
The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
|
|
Full Idea:
The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
|
|
From:
A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
|
|
A reaction:
This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.
|