Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Idea of Equality' and 'On Freedom'

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9 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Derivative truths are of two sorts: some are analysed into original truths, others admit of an infinite process of analysis. The former are necessary, the latter are contingent.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.108)
     A reaction: An intriguing proposal. Hume would presumably see contingent truths as being analysed until you reach 'impressions'. Analysis of necessary truths soon comes to the blinding light of what is obvious, but analysis of contingency never gets there.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Only God sees contingent truths a priori.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.95)
     A reaction: This because everything is interconnected, and the whole picture must be seen to understand a contingent truth.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106)
     A reaction: A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
     Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion.
     From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro
     A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: A highly rational, efficient and unmitigated application of the idea of equality of opportunity, while abandoning the idea of equality of respect as vague and nostalgic, would lead to a quite inhuman society.
     From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §3)
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Equality seems to require that each person is owed an effort at identification; they should not be seen as a surface to which a label can be applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from their point of view.
     From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2)
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Supporters of equality have asserted that people are alike in certain things they could do or achieve, as well as in the things that they need and could suffer.
     From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2)
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: It is a mark of extreme exploitation or degradation that those who suffer it do NOT see themselves differently from the way they are seen by the exploiters.
     From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2)
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We can regard it as certain that everything is done by God in the most perfect way, that he does nothing which is contrary to reason.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.109)
     A reaction: The famous optimism which Voltaire laughed at in 'Candide'. I can't help thinking that there is an ideal of God being ABOVE reason. We reason, and give reasons, because we are unsure, and life is a struggle. The highest ideal is mystically self-evident.