9 ideas
| 3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
| 13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
| Full Idea: Fred Sommers, in his treatment of types, says that two ontological categories cannot overlap; they are either disjoint, or one properly includes the other. This is sometimes referred to as Sommers' Law. | |
| From: report of Fred Sommers (Types and Ontology [1963], p.355) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §24 | |
| A reaction: The 'types', of course, go back to Bertrand Russell's theory of types, which is important in discussions of ontological categories. Carnap pursued it, trying to derive ontological categories from grammatical categories. 85% agree with Sommers. |
| 1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
| A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
| 1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
| 3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
| 3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
| 22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion. | |
| From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro | |
| A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard. |
| 1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
| A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
| 1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |