Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Fragments', 'Freedom to Act' and 'Letters to Leibniz'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
16007 I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: I always reason from existence, not towards existence.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.40)
     A reaction: Kierkegaard's important premise to help show that theistic proofs for God's existence don't actually prove existence, but develop the content of a conception. [SY]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12750 The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
     Full Idea: The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality.
     From: Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8
     A reaction: This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
16013 Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: Can the necessary come into existence? That is a change, and everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary. The necessary already 'is'.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.74)
     A reaction: [SY]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
19698 Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
     Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
     A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.